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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
THREE ESSAYS ON THE MICROSTRUCTURE OF EXCHANGE TRADED FUNDS 
by 
Samique March 
Florida International University, 2013 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Suchismita Mishra, Major Professor 
Exchange traded funds (ETFs) have increased significantly in popularity since they were 
first introduced in 1993. However, there is still much that is unknown about ETFs in the extant 
literature. This dissertation attempts to fill gaps in the ETF literature by using three related essays. 
In these three essays, we compare ETFs to closed ended mutual funds (CEFs) by decomposing 
the bid-ask spread into its three components; we look at the intraday shape of ETFs and compare 
it to the intraday shape of equities as well as examine the co-integration factor between ETFs on 
the London Stock Exchange and the New York Stock Exchange; we also examine the differences 
between leveraged ETFs and unleveraged ETFs by analyzing the impact of liquidity and 
volatility. These three essays are presented in Chapters 1, 2, and 3, respectively. 
Chapter one uses the Huang and Stoll (1997) model to decompose the bid-ask spread in 
CEFs and ETFs for two distinct periods—a normal and a volatile period. We show a higher 
adverse selection component for CEFs than for ETFs without regard to volatility. However, both 
ETFs and CEFs increased in magnitude of the adverse selection component in the period of high 
volatility. Chapter two uses a mix of the Werner and Kleidon (1993) and the Hupperets and 
Menkveld (2002) methods to get the intraday shape of ETFs and analyze co-integration between 
London and New York trading. We find two different shapes for New York and London ETFs. 
There also appears to be evidence of co-integration in the overlapping two-hour trading period 
but not over the entire trading day for the two locations. The third chapter discusses the new class 
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of ETFs called leveraged ETFs. We examine the liquidity and depth differences between 
unleveraged and leveraged ETFs at the aggregate level and when the leveraged ETFs are 
classified by the leveraged multiples of -3, -2, -1, 2, and 3, both for a normal and a volatile 
period. We find distinct differences between leveraged and unleveraged ETFs at the aggregate 
level, with leveraged ETFs having larger spreads than unleveraged ETFs. Furthermore, while 
both leveraged and unleveraged ETFs have larger spreads in high volatility, for the leveraged 
ETFs the change in magnitude is significantly larger than for the unleveraged ETFs. Among the 
multiples, the -2 leveraged ETF is the most pronounced in its liquidity characteristics, more so in 
volatile times. 
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PREFACE TO THE DISSERTATION 
An Exchange Traded Fund (ETF) is a portfolio of stocks, bonds, options and other 
instruments that trade as one stock on a stock exchange within a trading day. They are designed to 
closely follow an underlying asset like an index, sector or group. The SPDRs – the ETF on the 
S&P500 – were the first ETFs to be manufactured in the USA and were launched in 1993. They 
have led to about 845 ETFs as of December 2010 being traded in the marketplace according to 
Masterdata.com. ETF Magazine reported that the asset under management in these funds would 
reach one trillion dollars by the end of 2011, and they have surpassed that. 
ETFs are traded both on the primary and secondary markets. In the primary market, 
investors called authorized participants – normally large institutional investors – are allowed to 
trade in creation units. Creation units vary by ETFs but typically range from 25,000 to 200,000 
shares. Authorized participants are allowed to redeem or create new ETF shares by exchanging 
one ETF share for a correctly proportioned basket of the underlying portfolio of assets. In a 
secondary market, any investor can buy shares of the ETF from an authorized participant who 
decides to be a market maker for that ETF. 
The authorized participant acting as a market maker would then correct the supply and 
demand of ETF shares in the secondary market by creating and redeeming ETF shares in the 
primary market as needed. This mechanism allows the market maker to effectively control how 
close the ETF trades to its Net Asset Value(NAV) – a fund’s total net assets divided by the 
number of outstanding shares. All the market participants in the secondary market trade at the 
market price depicted by the market makers and the laws of supply and demand but not at the 
NAV. However, market makers do tend to keep the market price close to the NAV by efficiently 
managing their creations and redemptions. If the market price gets above or below the NAV, the 
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market maker would reduce or increase the amount of shares outstanding, which would then 
adjust both the market price and the NAV. 
ETFs are structured in one of three ways, either as an Exchange Traded Open End Index 
Mutual Fund, an Exchange Traded Unit Investment Trust or an Exchange Traded Grantor Trust. 
Both Exchange Traded Open End Index Mutual Funds and Exchange Traded Unit Investment 
Trusts are registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940. Exchange Traded Open End 
Index Mutual Funds allow for the use of derivatives in fund construction and securities lending. 
Dividends are also allowed to be reinvested immediately. They are then paid out quarterly to 
investors. This arrangement results in less cash holdings than with the Exchange Traded Unit 
Investment Trust. Exchange Traded Unit Investment Trusts have to wholly replicate the 
underlying portfolio while limiting investments made in a single issue to 25% or less. The major 
difference in comparison to the Open End Index Mutual Fund is that the Unit Investment Trusts 
are not allowed to reinvest their dividends immediately but must still payout the dividends 
quarterly. Exchange Traded Grantor Trusts are slightly different in that the investor is an actual 
owner of the shares in the companies that constitute the ETF's underlying portfolio and, therefore, 
has all the rights of a shareholder including voting rights. Dividends are not reinvested and are 
paid directly to the shareholders and not the Trust. In addition, the shares are bought and sold in 
100 share increments and do not have creation units like other ETFs.  
There are several different types of ETFs. ETFs can be decomposed based on the 
portfolio that they follow. In that case, according to Masterdata, there would be five different 
categories of ETFs: US equity ETFs, global equity ETFs, fixed income ETFs, commodity ETFs, 
and Asset Allocation ETFs. However, ETFs can be broken down into other type formats. There 
are leveraged ETFs, Currency ETFs, Index ETFs, Hedge Fund ETFs, Exchange Traded 
Commodities (ETCs), and Exchange Traded Notes (ETNs).  
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A Closed End Mutual Fund (CEF) is a type of mutual fund that issues a particular amount 
of shares and rarely issues new shares after the original issuance. Unlike an Open End Mutual 
Fund, CEFs trade within a trading day on the secondary market at a market price determined by 
supply and demand. After the fund is launched, transactions rarely occur in the primary market as 
share issuance is closed. Therefore, most of the transactions occur in the secondary market. In the 
secondary market, investors acquire shares at the market price and not the NAV price from the 
market maker. Closed End funds have been shown historically to deviate from the NAV and trade 
at either a premium or a discount. These funds tend to trade more at discounts to their NAV, 
which has spawned much academic research into the "closed end fund puzzle." Lee, Shliefer, and 
Thaler (1990) describe the four part anomaly of the CEFs that are quite puzzling. CEFs tend to 
start trading at or close to NAV but pretty soon start trading at a discount to the NAV. These 
deviations from the NAV tend to be time-varying and differ based on the fund. If CEFs are 
converted to open ended funds, these deviations tend to rapidly converge with the NAV. 
CEFs are actively managed, and thus the management charges a fee that can be based on 
the common asset base or the total asset base of the fund. In addition to management fees, there 
are other administrative fees that are incurred by the fund, which reduce the amount of investor 
returns. The net asset values for CEFs are typically reported on a weekly basis so that investors 
can mark to market their portfolio.  
There are several differences and similarities between these two funds. Both ETFs and 
CEFs differ from Open End Mutual Funds in that they are traded on a stock exchange on an 
intraday basis. CEFs are actively managed while most ETFs are passively managed. ETFs are 
more transparent as the exact portfolio that constitutes the fund is publicly known whereas with 
the CEFs, the portfolio construction is not known most of the time as CEF portfolios are not 
required to have continual disclosure. Investors can complete a short sell of an ETF on a 
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downtick whereas with the CEF, a short sell can only be completed on an uptick. Capital gains 
taxation might also be a concern for customers who invest in CEFs rather than in ETFs. 
Advantages of ETFs over CEFs are that they are transparent, exhibit low expense ratio 
(thus are extremely cost-effective), tax-efficient (capital gains do not need to be redistributed but 
are reinvested instead), and they tend to trade closer to their Net Asset Value. ETFs are priced in 
short intervals throughout the day in accordance with the underlying portfolio. Therefore, the net 
asset value is made available every 15 seconds throughout the day. Because the portfolios are 
actively managed, most CEF managers rebalance them once a month or at least once a quarter. 
However, with the ETF, since most are passively managed, rebalancing occurs infrequently. 
Leveraged ETFs are one example of the exception as these are balanced on a daily basis to 
maintain the exposure in the correct multiple. 
This dissertation is comprised of three essays that focus on three topics related to 
exchange traded funds. The first essay will discuss the disparity exhibited between ETFs and 
CEFs in the equities market when the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread is 
analyzed. Here we use the Huang and Stoll(1997) model to decompose the bid-ask spread for two 
distinct periods – one of normal volatility and the other of abnormally high volatility. The 
decomposed spread shows a higher adverse selection component for CEFs than for ETFs. 
However both ETFs and CEFs increased in magnitude of the adverse selection component in high 
volatility. The second essay looks at the co-integration factor on the London Stock Exchange in 
comparison to the New York Stock Exchange as it relates to the ETFs as well as the impact of the 
U-shape. We find two different shapes for New York and London. There also appears to be 
evidence of co-integration in the overlapping two-hour trading period but not over the entire 
trading day. The third essay discusses the new class of ETFs called leveraged ETFs while looking 
at unleveraged versus leveraged ETFs at the aggregate level as well as the decomposed leveraged 
ETF into the leveraged multiples of -3, -2, -1, 2, and 3. We find distinct differences between 
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leveraged and unleveraged ETFs at the aggregate level. When the leveraged ETFs are 
decomposed into multiples, the -2 leveraged ETFs stand out the most.  
The three essays are interlinked based on the subject of the study: ETFs. However, they 
are each independently presented and each chapter is comprised of individual sections dedicated 
to introduction, literature review and hypothesis, data and methodology, results, and conclusion. 
CHAPTER 1: ADVERSE SELECTION AS DEPICTED BY ETFS AND CEFS 
1.1 Introduction 
The adverse selection component from spread decomposition is analyzed for both ETFs 
and CEFs in order to ascertain the information asymmetry differences between these two similar 
basket securities. It is interesting to see if the adverse selection component drives the spread more 
in CEFs than in ETFs and thus can explain why two instruments that are so similar happen to 
behave so differently. Also, does the adverse selection component in periods of excess volatility, 
increase dramatically and widen between the two assets? This chapter attempts to address both of 
these issues. We add to the information asymmetry literature in the selection of the financial 
assets that are being studied and compared.  
The efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970) has directly and indirectly helped to 
produce countless research papers as researchers seek to find unequivocal evidence to support or 
attack the hypothesis (Malkiel, 2003). The efficient market hypothesis is closely related to the 
random walk model of price series. In a random walk model, the future price changes are 
independent of past price changes. The random walk process is defined as a special martingale 
where independent and identically distributed zero-mean random variables are summed (Ross, 
1996). This random walk process should be distinctly reflected in a basket of securities such as 
the financial assets of exchange traded funds (ETFs) and closed end funds (CEFs). These two 
securities are very similar to each other but differ on how much they trade relative to their net 
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asset values. This is a direct result of the construction of ETFs that allow the creation or 
redemption of additional shares, unlike its counterpart, the CEF. Due to the construction of these 
seemingly similar products, information asymmetry ought to be reflected more pronouncedly in 
the CEFs than in the ETFs. There should exist a larger adverse selection component in the CEFs 
than in the ETFs, which may be as a result of the difference in transparency between the two 
types of funds. The existence of information asymmetry refutes the existence of strong form 
market efficiency. 
One of the mediums that has been used to attack the validity of the efficient market 
hypothesis is market microstructure theoretical and empirical research. The main mode of attack 
in market microstructure is that of spread decomposition. Beginning with Roll (1984), there has 
been an increased push to provide information regarding spread decomposition of financial 
assets. Spread decomposition has three components, namely adverse selection cost, inventory 
holding cost and order processing cost (Stoll, 1989; Huang & Stoll, 1997; Glosten & Harris, 
1988). This effort in explanation has introduced us to the information asymmetries that face the 
dealer who has to interface with informed traders, plus the uninformed traders who then have to 
interact with these dealers. Information asymmetry implies the existence of arbitrage 
opportunities made available to traders with more information than the 
casual/uninformed/liquidity trader. Adverse selection has been studied as one of the required 
costs incurred by a dealer in his role of managing the bid-ask spread, which is his trading cost 
(Holden & Avanidhar, 1992; Easley & O'Hara, 1987; Glosten & Milgrom, 1985; Copeland & 
Galai, 1983).  
Studies on adverse selection agree on its existence, but the actual degree of adverse 
selection based on each study suffers from severe disparity (Chelley-Steeley & Park, 2008). 
Studies on ETFs are few, but combination studies with closed end funds are even rarer. Adverse 
selection can account for the existence of a bid-ask spread (Glosten & Milgrom, 1985); therefore, 
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evaluation of the bid-ask spread for both ETFs and closed end funds leads to an indication of the 
level of adverse selection in each type of asset. The methodology proposed in Huang and Stoll 
(1997) is used to evaluate the adverse selection component that is present in each of these assets. 
The Huang and Stoll methodology fully decomposes the spread into its three components 
simultaneously: an order processing component, an adverse selection component, and an 
inventory component. Moreover, Huang and Stoll (1997) successfully demonstrate how other 
bid-ask spread models are all related to the general form model by adding constraints. Once 
decomposed, the adverse selection component is compared for both ETFs and CEFs to ascertain 
how much of a role adverse selection plays in these two instruments. In a comparison between the 
adverse selection costs, the ETFs should have a smaller adverse selection component than the 
CEFs as premiums tend to be smaller for ETFs. This finding is synonymous with the findings in 
Engle and Sarkar (2002). 
Neal and Wheatley (1998), as well as Clarke and Shastri (2001) look at the adverse 
selection components using CEFs and the stocks that comprise their index, but this study 
compares the adverse selection component in both CEFs and ETFs simultaneously. This result 
will be of interest because ETFs have become quite popular, particularly in the last decade. As a 
result of this popularity, it becomes a necessity to learn more about these instruments. Can these 
instruments truly co-exist together because they have their own niche market? Since ETFs were 
introduced, what is the impact on the adverse selection component of matched CEFs? Guedj and 
Huang (2008) have investigated the replacement possibilities of ETFs and Open Ended Mutual 
Funds (OEFs), primarily because of this popularity. They find that OEFs are beneficial to a select 
sect that wants insurance for future liquidity purposes while ETFs are beneficial when it comes to 
less liquid assets. Therefore, the co-existence of both the CEFs and ETFs is based on supplying 
the niche of the market that is most benefitted by these two types of funds (Barnhart & 
Rosenstein, forthcoming).  
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We find that the order processing component of both CEFs and ETFs is the biggest 
component of the bid ask spread irrespective of volatility. We also find that CEFs exhibit a higher 
adverse selection component than ETFS irrespective of volatility. However, in higher volatility, 
the adverse selection component of both CEFs and ETFS is larger in magnitude compared to 
normal volatility. 
The rest of the chapter is divided into the following sections: 1.2 – literature review and 
hypothesis, 1.3 – data and methodology, 1.4 – results, and 1.5 – conclusion. 
1.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis  
Market microstructure models have been prevalent that analyze the difference between 
the bid and ask quotes, called the spread. Roll (1984) was the first to introduce a covariance type 
model to decompose the spread. Glosten and Harris (1988) introduced a new way to decompose 
the spread by using a trade indicator type model. All of the other spread decomposition models 
can either be described as one of these two types of models (Stoll, 1989; Lin, Sanger, & Booth, 
1995; Huang & Stoll, 1997; George, Kaul, & Nimalendran, 1991; Choi, Salandro, & Shastri, 
1988; Madhavan, Richardson, & Roomans, 1997; Hasbrouck, 1991; Huang & Stoll, 1994). 
Furthermore, Huang and Stoll (1997) showed that both types of models can be derived from one 
basic trade indicator model, given specific assumptions. The research has shown that there are 
three components of the spread with the order processing cost being the largest component 
followed by two other costs, namely the inventory holding cost and the adverse selection cost.  
Huang and Stoll (1997) decomposed the bid-ask spread into its three distinct components 
using a simple trade indicator model. This model has the advantage over other models in that 
each component can be distinctly derived without overlapping each other. Unlike the Huang and 
Stoll (1997) model, other spread decomposition models do not have informed trader variables as 
their only significant relations, which lend added support to the superiority of the model to fully 
decompose the spread and measure adverse selection (Van Ness, Van Ness, & Warr, 2001).  
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Kyle (1985) introduced the importance of the adverse selection component as it affects 
dealers and uninformed liquidity traders by informed traders. Further research has been 
conducted to show that adverse selection is an important component to consider when 
decomposing the spread (Easley & O'Hara, 1987; Glosten & Milgrom, 1985; Copeland & Galai, 
1983). These researchers analyzed the impact of having informed traders in a market setting, 
where liquidity/uninformed traders and the market maker are the other players. Informed trading 
has been shown to create a considerable impact on the market maker, who sets the bid and ask 
quotes, therefore adversely affecting the uninformed/liquidity traders who have to pay the penalty 
to the market maker. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) proposed three main reasons for adverse 
selection. They attribute the existence of adverse selection to the level of accurate information 
available to the informed traders, the amount of informed trading relative to the amount of 
liquidity trading, and the expectation that the liquidity trader has regarding future supply and 
demand. The importance of adverse selection has led to a number of studies as we seek to analyze 
the effect of adverse selection (Neal & Wheatley, 1998; Van Ness, Van Ness, & Warr, 2001; 
Clarke & Shastri, 2001). 
ETFs and CEFs are both basket securities. Researchers Neal and Wheatley (1998) and 
Clarke and Shastri (2001) focus on closed end funds while measuring the impact of adverse 
selection models. Both sets of scholars cite the transparency of these funds as a basis for their 
choice of instruments to analyze. While it has been contended that ETFs and CEFs have a level of 
transparency, ETFs are certainly more transparent than CEFs. The composition of the ETF 
portfolio can easily be obtained at a moment's notice while most CEF portfolio composition is 
unknown. In addition, the NAV for ETFs are reportedly throughout the day and updated at 15-
second intervals whereas CEFs have their NAVs reported often at the minimum of a week. 
Furthermore, ETFs allow the authorized participants (APs) to create and redeem shares. These 
Aps then act as market makers in the ETF shares, thus effectively playing the role of a dealer, 
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enhancing liquidity and diffusing the persistence of adverse selection. The persistence in the 
CEFs has no such diffusing partner and thus would persist longer. Therefore, by this mere fact of 
transparency, there is an asymmetric level of information for investors interested in CEFs and 
ETFs.  
Neal and Wheatley (1998) found a significantly large adverse selection component in the 
decomposed bid-ask spreads of the CEFs under study. In comparison to Neal and Wheatley 
(1998), Clarke and Shastri (2001) enlarged the number of CEFs, and included a more universal 
scope of the types of CEFs by also analyzing bond and international equity CEFs in addition to 
the domestic equity CEFs. Clarke and Shastri found a significantly lower adverse selection 
component embedded in the bid-ask spread of the CEFs than in their corresponding underlying 
portfolio of stocks. Chelley-Steeley and Park (2008) observed a significant adverse selection 
component for ETFs when examined using the spread decomposition models. Based on this 
rationale, we make the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis One: The adverse selection component embedded in the spread of the ETFs is 
considerably lower than the adverse selection component embedded in the spread of the 
CEFs.  
In periods of high volatility, like the fall of 2008, information asymmetry should be more 
pronounced than in periods of lower volatility. High volatility implies decreased liquidity. This 
dynamic should also translate into the spread decomposition component of adverse selection for 
both ETFs and CEFs. Therefore, we develop hypothesis two. 
Hypothesis Two: The magnitude of the adverse selection component of both CEFs and 
ETFs increases significantly in periods of high volatility, but CEFs have a larger 
magnitude than ETFs that increases linearly with volatility.  
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1.3 Data and Methodology 
The Bloomberg terminal provides data for ETFs and CEFs. This dataset was manipulated 
based on filters to select the ETFs and CEFs that are traded in the United States. ETFs have 
recently branched into a further innovation of leveraged ETFs, which purport to return two to 
three times the return of the index directly or one to three times of the return of the index 
inversely. In order not to compound leverage effects into the results, these ETFs are also removed 
from the analysis. In order to remain a part of the sample, both CEFs and ETFs had to have 
remained liquid for one year before the date of study and one year after in similarity to Neal and 
Wheatley (1998).  
The periods of focus are April 2006 to June 2006 and September 2008 to December 
2008. The year 2006 was a relatively normal year in terms of volatility, while the fall of 2008 was 
extremely volatile. These two periods give interesting and comparative results for a volatile and a 
non-volatile time frame. The bids, asks, and trades of the ETFs and CEFs were obtained from 
TAQ data. Screening methodologies, normally used in intraday studies, were employed. All 
observations before market open at 9:30 a.m. and market close at 4 p.m. were removed to exclude 
any overnight positions. If the ask or bid or size was equal to zero or negative, then the quote was 
deleted. If the bid-ask spread was greater than $5 or negative, then the quote was also deleted. If 
the price of volume was equal to zero or negative, then the trade was deleted.  
Quotes and Trades are not automatically matched in the database. Hence, quotes were 
matched to trades that took place five seconds later as dealers usually place quotes before trades 
are executed. TAQ data does not explicitly identify buys and sells; therefore, the commonly used 
tick test by Lee and Ready (1991) was utilized. The midpoint of the bid and ask quote was used 
as a benchmark. If the trade was transacted above the midpoint, then that was considered a buy 
and the variable Q was assigned a value of 1. However, if the trade was transacted below the 
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midpoint, then it was considered a sell, and the variable Q was assigned a value of -1. If the trade 
transacted was at the midpoint, then Q was assigned a value of 0.  
The Huang and Stoll (1997) model is implemented by first establishing a basic trade 
indicator model then using two extensions to distinguish between all three spread components. It 
is a regression procedure that uses the generalized method of moments to provide consistent 
estimates of the non-linear parameters directly. The basic trade indicator model makes no 
assumption about the conditional probability of trades – hence its easy implementation. The two 
extensions to the basic model are facilitated through the assumption of negative serial correlation 
and portfolio trading pressure. They simultaneously estimate two equations that capture the 
evolution of conditional expectations about the direction of trades and changes in the midpoint 
price, respectively. Since we are using the universe of ETFs and CEFs and it would be difficult to 
make assumptions about how many securities of each type dealers have in their portfolio, we only 
look at the extended model with induced serial correlation. 
The basic model follows from substituting observable values into the unobservable price, 
Vt , which gives rise to  
 ∆𝑃𝑃? =
?
?
𝑄𝑄? − 𝑄𝑄??? + 𝜆𝜆
?
?
𝑄𝑄??? + 𝑒𝑒?    (1) 
S is the estimated traded spread; Q is the trade indicator that takes the values of -1, 0, 1 
depending on whether the trade occurs at the ask, midpoint, or bid, respectively; λ = α + β, where 
α is the adverse selection component and β is the inventory holding component of the bid-ask 
spread. From this equation we can compute the component of the spread that is not due to either 
adverse selection or inventory holding, ( 1 – λ), which represents the order processing component 
of the spread. We also look at the effect that size could have on the components of the spread, and 
the basic model is adjusted to reflect that 
∆𝑃𝑃? =
𝑆𝑆??
2
𝐷𝐷?
?? + 𝜆𝜆?? − 1
𝑆𝑆??
2
𝐷𝐷???
?? +
𝑆𝑆?
2
𝐷𝐷?
? + 𝜆𝜆? − 1
𝑆𝑆?
2
𝐷𝐷???
? + 
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???
?
𝐷𝐷?
?? + 𝜆𝜆?? − 1
???
?
𝐷𝐷???
?? + 𝑒𝑒?      (2) 
where 𝐷𝐷?? = 𝑄𝑄?  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣  𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  𝑡𝑡 ≤ 1,000  𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎; 0  𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒                 
𝐷𝐷?
? =   𝑄𝑄?  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  1000  𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎   < 𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣  𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  𝑡𝑡   < 10,000  𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎; 0  𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 
𝐷𝐷?
?? = 𝑄𝑄?  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣  𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  𝑡𝑡   ≥ 10,000  𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎; 0  𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 
The basic model is extended by using the conditional expectation of trade, where the trade that 
happened before the current one is known.  Once a dealer makes a trade, then the revision of the 
quote occurs following that trade, and hence subsequent trades are dependent on the trade that 
occurred before. This assessment gives rise to a probability estimator, π, which is defined as the 
probability that the current trade is opposite in sign to the trade that occurred just before. Using 
this probability with the precept that negative serial correlation in trades, Qt , and in quote 
revisions, ΔMt , varies from negative serial correlation in transaction price changes, ΔPt , gives 
rise to the extended model where all three components of the spread are distinctly identified. 
𝐸𝐸 𝑄𝑄??? 𝑄𝑄??? =   1 − 2𝜋𝜋 𝑄𝑄???                                                           (3) 
∆𝑀𝑀? = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽
????
?
𝑄𝑄??? − 𝛼𝛼 1 − 2𝜋𝜋
????
?
𝑄𝑄??? + 𝜖𝜖?                (4) 
where, Qt is the buy-sell indicator for the transaction price, Pt , and π is the probability 
that the trade at time t is opposite in sign to the trade at t- 1. Mt is the midpoint of the quote that 
prevails just before the transaction at time t. St is the posted spread immediately prior to the 
transaction at time t. α and β are proportions where α represents the percentage of the half spread 
attributable to adverse selection costs, and β represents the portion attributable to the inventory 
cost. The remainder of the half spread corresponds to the order processing component and is 
equivalent to (1-α-β).  
1.4 Results 
For the two periods that are analyzed, Table 1-1 reports the summary statistics. The first 
item of note is that while both CEFs and ETFs from 2006 to 2008 have increased in transactions, 
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as evidenced by the number of observations, ETFs have seen more exponential growth in 2008 
when compared to 2006. This increase is not only a function of volatility and volume, but the 
number of ETFs that are actively traded has increased significantly over this period. Based on 
mean price, CEFs are more affordable to trade than ETFs, but ETFs offer more liquidity in 
narrower mean spreads over both periods. Spread and price decrease for CEFs and ETFs between 
2006 and 2008. For both fund groups, the small size seems to be the driving force behind the 
mean spread and price. Notably, large size CEFs are the only group that records an increase in 
mean spread from 2006 to 2008. These results highlight that volatility does make a difference in 
ETFs’ and CEFs’ spreads but the impact is more pronounced for CEFs; hence, underscoring the 
importance of analyzing the impact of volatility. 
Table 1-2 reports the findings from estimating equation 1 using the generalized method 
of moments. Here again we see that the estimate for traded spread is larger in 2006 than in 2008. 
However, the traded spread in CEFs is larger than that of ETFs regardless of the year. Equation 
one distinctly identifies the order processing component as 1-λ but sums the inventory holding 
and adverse selection components together into the parameter, λ. We observe that the order 
processing component is the largest in magnitude of the three spread components for both CEFs 
and ETFs. ETFs have a bigger order processing component than CEFs, so this scenario implies 
that there is a smaller adverse selection component for ETFs even though it is not uniquely 
distinct in the combined parameter, λ. The parameter, λ, is smaller in 2006 than in 2008 for CEFs, 
but the converse is true for ETFs, which exhibit a larger λ in 2008 versus 2006. We take this trend 
as an indication that the adverse selection component for CEFs grew from 2006 to 2008 and that 
there is a positive correlation between the increase in volatility and the adverse selection 
component of CEFs. 
 To get an understanding of how different size trades may be impacted by 
volatility in CEFs and ETFs, equation 2 uses the generalized method of moments to decompose 
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equation one into size categories. Table 1-3 reports the findings of equation 2. The traded spread 
estimate shows a linear growth for CEFs in 2006 where the large size is greater than medium size, 
and the medium size is greater than the small size. In 2008, there is some reversal of this linear 
relationship as the small size has the largest traded spread and the medium size has the smallest 
traded spread for the CEFs. In 2006, the ETFs with the largest traded spread are the large size 
while the medium size has the smallest traded spread. In 2008, the order switches up with the 
small size having the smallest traded spread and the large size retains the largest traded spread. 
Overall, the CEFs have the larger traded spread in comparison to the ETFs. The order processing 
component is still the largest component of the spread for all the three sizes. Generally, CEFs 
have a smaller order processing component than the ETFs when comparing sizes. The ETFs 
remained fairly stable in spread component magnitude between periods from 2006 to 2008 
despite the volatility in the market, but the CEFs exhibited a large change in the component size 
to the tune of 30%. 
Robustness checks using over-identifying restrictions were imposed on equation 2 to 
examine the estimate variation. Two constraints were used to this end. The first constraint 
restricts the traded spread so that it does not vary with size, but order processing costs vary with 
size. The equation estimated under this constraint is  
∆𝑃𝑃? =
?
?
(𝐷𝐷?
?? + 𝐷𝐷?
? + 𝐷𝐷?
??) + 𝜆𝜆?? − 1
???
?
𝐷𝐷???
?? + 𝜆𝜆? − 1
??
?
𝐷𝐷???
? + 𝜆𝜆?? −
1
???
?
𝐷𝐷???
?? + 𝑒𝑒?  (5) 
The second constraint restricts both the traded spread and the order processing costs, so 
they do not vary with size. Table 1-4 reports the result of the over-identifying restrictions. The 
results are similar to the results in Table 1-3, except in magnitude. 
To further decompose the spread into the three distinct components, negative serial 
correlation is taken into account. The extended model identifies each component of the spread 
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distinctly, and the results are reported in Table 1-5. The adverse selection component comes out 
negative for both CEFs and ETFS. Huang and Stoll (1997) attribute this dynamic to trade 
clustering. Trade clustering occurs when sequential orders that might be part of a large order are 
recorded independently. To address this issue, the data are reorganized to cluster these sequential 
orders that do not cause quote revision into one order. Clustering the trades and rerunning the 
extended model are reported as the findings in Table 1-6. The adverse selection component is 
now positive and a significant portion of the three components of the spread. The CEFs have a 
bigger adverse selection component than the ETFs. 
1.5 Conclusion 
Previous research has shown the existence of a significant adverse selection component 
for the basket securities, ETFs and CEFs independently. However, both types of basket securities 
were not compared to analyze the level of information asymmetry between the two. Here we 
observed two different periods, one of normal volatility and the other of abnormally high 
volatility. We found that the order processing component of both CEFs and ETFs was the biggest 
component of the bid ask spread irrespective of volatility. We also found that CEFs exhibit a 
higher adverse selection component than ETFS irrespective of volatility. However, in higher 
volatility, the adverse selection component of both CEFs and ETFS was larger compared to 
normal volatility. This result makes economic sense as informed traders would have more 
transactions in which to hide their trades behind the uninformed traders as volume also increases 
with volatility. As a consequence, dealers need to assess their quotes revision practices in volatile 
times compared to normal times in order to ensure adequate pricing for information asymmetry. 
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Table 1-1: Summary Statistics 
The descriptive statistics for trade price and traded spread for closed ended funds (CEF) and exchange traded funds (ETF) by trade size for April – June 2006 
and September – December 2008. The trade size is based on volume such that small size is less than 1,000 shares, medium size is between 1,000 and 10,000 
shares, and large size is at least 10,000 shares. 
 Trade Size # of Observations Mean Price Std. Dev. Price Mean Spread Std. Dev Spread 
2006       
CEF ALL 2259758 18.6517 13.5160 0.1690 0.3211 
 SMALL 1935427 19.4352 13.9667 0.1754 0.3295 
 MEDIUM 318799 14.0125  9.1057 0.1295 0.2593 
 LARGE 5532 11.8889 9.8824 0.1908 0.4112 
ETF ALL 22118888 77.4495 38.1065 0.0487 0.1888 
 SMALL 19816539 78.0214 38.0065 0.0487 0.1896 
 MEDIUM 2166290 73.0269 38.4717 0.0478 0.1777 
 LARGE 136059 64.5814 39.8793 0.0632 0.2334 
       
2008       
CEF ALL 9784564 9.1573 239.1925 0.1508 0.2054 
 SMALL 9039984 9.3037 248.8452 0.1519 0.2068 
 MEDIUM 735199 7.3903 3.8228  0.1361 0.1862 
 LARGE 9381 6.6131 4.2617 0.2098 0.2722 
ETF ALL 322110950 55.0451 32.0174 0.0444 0.2171 
 SMALL 310834601 55.1731 31.7886 0.0446 0.2173 
 MEDIUM 10835763 51.7311 37.5968 0.0393 0.2118 
 LARGE 440586 46.2458 37.6063 0.0401 0.2115 
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Table 1-2: Traded Spread and Order Processing Component 
The results from estimating ∆𝑃𝑃? =
?
?
𝑄𝑄? − 𝑄𝑄??? + 𝜆𝜆
?
?
𝑄𝑄??? + 𝑒𝑒? are reported. The estimated traded spread (S) as well as the proportion of traded spread due 
to adverse selection and inventory holding (λ) is shown. The proportion of the traded spread due to order processing is calculated as 1 – λ and is also shown.  
 S  Λ  1-λ 
 Coefficent Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error  
2006      
CEF 0.0331 0.0002 0.2151 0.0017 0.7849 
ETF 0.0269 0.0023 0.0379 0.0068 0.9620 
      
2008      
CEF 0.1650 0.1331 0.3266 0.0275 0.6733 
ETF 0.0253 0.0007 0.0358 0.0012 0.9641 
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Table 1-3: Traded Spread and Order Processing Component by Trade Size 
The results from estimating ∆𝑃𝑃? =
???
?
𝐷𝐷?
?? + 𝜆𝜆?? − 1
???
?
𝐷𝐷???
?? +
??
?
𝐷𝐷?
? + 𝜆𝜆? − 1
??
?
𝐷𝐷???
? +
???
?
𝐷𝐷?
?? + 𝜆𝜆?? − 1
???
?
𝐷𝐷???
?? + 𝑒𝑒? are reported. The 
estimated traded spread (S), as well as the proportion of traded spread due to adverse selection and inventory holding (λ) is shown. The proportion of the 
traded spread due to order processing is calculated as 1 – λ and is also shown. The trade size is based on volume such that small size is less than 1,000 
shares, medium size is between 1,000 and 10,000 shares, and large size is at least 10,000 shares. 
 S Λ 1-λ 
 Sm SE Med SE Lg SE Sm SE Med SE Lg SE Sm Med Lg 
2006                
CEF 0.0327 0.0002 0.0352 0.0002 0.0698 0.0038 0.2040 0.0020 0.2713 0.0042 0.3714 0.0293 0.7960 0.7287 0.6286 
ETF 0.0268 0.0024 0.0252 0.0016 0.0509 0.0025 0.0396 0.0080 0.0280 0.0109 0.0099 0.0235 0.9604 0.9720 0.9901 
                
2008                
CEF 0.1726 0.1407 0.0793 0.0480 0.1669 0.0562 0.3456 0.0275 -0.172 0.0853 0.0536 0.0930 0.6544 1.0172 0.9464 
ETF 0.0253 0.0008 0.0262 0.0008 0.0525 0.0010 0.0367 0.0013 0.0149 0.0050 0.0025 0.0049 0.9633 0.9851 0.9975 
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Table 1-4: Restricted Models of Traded Spread and Order Processing Component by Trade Size 
The results from estimating ∆𝑃𝑃? by imposing over-identifying restrictions are reported for two constraints. The first constraint restricts the traded spread, so 
it does not vary with size, but order processing costs vary with size. Essentially, we estimate the following equation for the first constraint, ∆𝑃𝑃? =
?
?
(𝐷𝐷?
?? +
𝐷𝐷?
? + 𝐷𝐷?
??) + 𝜆𝜆?? − 1
???
?
𝐷𝐷???
?? + 𝜆𝜆? − 1
??
?
𝐷𝐷???
? + 𝜆𝜆?? − 1
???
?
𝐷𝐷???
?? + 𝑒𝑒?. The second constraint restricts both the traded spread and the order 
processing costs, so they do not vary with size. The estimated traded spread (S) as well as the proportion of traded spread due to adverse selection and 
inventory holding (λ) is shown. The trade size is based on volume, such that: small size is less than 1,000 shares, medium size is between 1,000 and 10,000 
shares, and large size is at least 10,000 shares. 
  S Λ 
  All Sizes  Small   Medium  Large  
  Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Constraint 1          
CEF 2006 0.0332 0.0002 0.2133 0.0019 0.2334 0.0043 -0.2790 0.0775 
 2008 0.1651 0.1333 0.3213 0.0240 0.3928 0.0639 0.00149 0.4210 
ETF 2006 0.0268 0.0023 0.0384 0.0078 0.0805 0.0190 -0.8496 0.1400 
 2008 0.0253 0.0008 0.0387 0.0013 -0.0067 0.0054 -0.9647 0.0458 
          
Constraint 2  All Sizes  All Sizes      
CEF 2006 0.0331 0.0002 0.2150 0.0016     
 2008 0.1650 0.1331 0.3266 0.0275     
ETF 2006 0.0269 0.0023 0.0379 0.0068     
 2008 0.0253 0.0007 0.0358 0.0012     
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Table 1-5: Components of the Bid-Ask Spread based on Serial Correlation in Trade Flows Without Trade Clusters 
The results from computing the extended model with induced serial correlation in trade flows is reported. Here, trade order flow clusters are not considered – 
sequential orders thought to be a part of one large order. The extended model distinctly shows the three components of the bid-ask spread – adverse selection 
(α), inventory holding (β), and order processing (1-α-β). The extended model simultaneously estimates the equations 𝐸𝐸 𝑄𝑄??? 𝑄𝑄??? = 1 − 2𝜋𝜋 𝑄𝑄??? + 𝜀𝜀? 
and  Δ𝑀𝑀? = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽
????
?
𝑄𝑄??? − 𝛼𝛼 1 − 2𝜋𝜋
????
?
𝑄𝑄??? + 𝑒𝑒?. 
 Α Β π 1-α-β 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient  
2006     
CEF -0.0324 0.0986 0.3139 0.9338 
ETF -0.0273 0.0952 0.1916 0.9321 
2008     
CEF -0.0569 0.1299 0.1210 0.9269 
ETF -0.0311 0.1033 0.0231 0.9277 
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Table 1-6: Components of the Bid-Ask Spread based on Serial Correlation in Trade Flows with Trade Clusters  
The results from computing the extended model with induced serial correlation in trade flows is reported. Here, trade order flow clusters are considered to be 
one order – sequential  orders without quote revision are  thought to be a part of one large order. The extended model distinctly shows the three components 
of the bid-ask spread – adverse selection (α), inventory holding (β), and order processing (1-α-β). The extended model simultaneously estimates the 
equations 𝐸𝐸 𝑄𝑄??? 𝑄𝑄??? = 1 − 2𝜋𝜋 𝑄𝑄??? + 𝜀𝜀? and Δ𝑀𝑀? = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽
????
?
𝑄𝑄??? − 𝛼𝛼 1 − 2𝜋𝜋
????
?
𝑄𝑄??? + 𝑒𝑒?. 
 Α β π 1-α-β 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient  
2006     
CEF 0.2323 0.3936 0.9135 0.3740 
ETF 0.1293 0.2352 0.8169 0.6354 
2008     
CEF 0.3562 0.4694 0.8216 0.1743 
ETF 0.1675 0.2981 0.7834 0.5343 
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CHAPTER 2: ETF: CO-INTEGRATION AND THE U-SHAPE 
2.1 Introduction 
The efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970) has been a stalwart issue in financial 
literature for several decades. However, if efficient markets were to truly exist, then arbitrage 
opportunities would not concurrently exist. Furthermore, there would be no evidence of a 
lagged relationship between markets, which provides arbitrage opportunities to traders. 
Trading in different markets that have non-overlapping or a few hours of overlapping trading 
hours should not result in available arbitrage opportunities, provided that markets are 
integrated. However, some markets seem to lag behind others and are affected by new 
revelations from other markets (Werner & Kleidon, 1996; Hupperets & Menkveld, 2002; Lin, 
Engle, & Ito, 1994).  
Therefore, if there is such a lag, or if it takes a significant time interval between 
trades for prices to coincide when one market opens and another closes, then this time lag 
would be an instrumental consideration when modeling price movements and evolution. This 
relationship can best be analyzed by looking at their intraday characteristics and how long it 
takes for markets to get integrated. This chapter analyzes the intraday shape of volatility, 
volume, and depth for ETFs on the domestic New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) as well as 
for iShares ETFs traded on both the NYSE and London Stock Exchange (LSE).  The intraday 
shape for the iShares ETFs grants insight into the market integration of both markets, where 
market integration is defined as the reflection of the same intrinsic information in prices in 
both markets. 
There has been an observed U-shape in US market equities (Goodhart & O'hara, 
1997; Jain & Joh, 1988; McInnish & Wood, 1992) as well as evidence of the U-shape in the 
London market (Werner & Kleidon, 1996; Abhyankar, Ghosh, Levin, & Limmack, 1997). 
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Therefore, this backdrop provides good material to examine market integration relationships 
since in integrated trading there should be one distinct U-shape instead of two. However, we 
will be using exchange traded funds (ETFs) to observe the market co-integration. Since the 
ETFs’ intraday characteristics have not been documented, we must first ascertain the intraday 
shape of the volume, volatility, and spread for the ETFs in order to proceed. Studying these 
basket securities provides us with an insight into the intraday shape of reduced risk securities, 
where unsystematic risk has been reduced compared to each individual stock in the 
underlying portfolio. Previous literature has used individual equities to look at the intraday 
shape and not basket securities.  
Since risk is often represented by volatility, does the reduction of risk through 
diversification play a significant role in the intraday shape of reduced risk securities even 
though we still observe the U-shape documented for individual stocks? The characteristics of 
the intraday shape of ETFs in the NYSE are first examined individually. The intraday 
characteristics of the universe of iShares ETFs in both New York and London are first 
compared, then the iShares ETFs that are based on the same underlying and traded in both 
New York and London are compared to see if there is an integrated U-shape or whether there 
are two distinct U-shapes as previously observed (Hupperets & Menkveld, 2002; Werner & 
Kleidon, 1996). Does the location of trade matter, where trading on one exchange is superior 
to trading another? Does sequential trading of cross-listed ETFs produce an integrated U-
shaped intraday pattern? Does the US macro-economic news affect London more than 
London’s news affects the US as shown in Hupperets and Menkveld (2002) as well as in Lin, 
Engle, and Ito (1991)?  
If markets were perfectly co-integrated, then the shape should transfer from one 
market to another uniformly. However, if any of the intraday shapes should deviate, 
particularly between the close of the LSE and the opening of the NYSE, then the markets 
would suffer from a time lag in integration. If there is such a deviation, is it present every day 
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or is it just a fluke that appears in a random fashion? There has been no seminal work done on 
the intraday shape of exchange traded funds or the co-integration effects between markets of 
reduced risk basket securities, such as ETFs. This study differs from Werner and Kleidon 
(1996) since some of the stocks used in their study are traded as ADRs, which have to be 
converted to observe true arbitrage, and that is not the case with the ETFs. As a result, ETFs 
do not have the cost of conversion that ADRs have, and neither do they have the same risk 
level due to the inherent diversification of a fund. Therefore, this chapter fills a void in the 
literature. 
The remainder of the chapter is divided into sections as follows: 2.2 – literature 
review and hypothesis, 2.3 – data and methodology, 2.4 – results, and 2.5 – conclusion. 
2.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis 
The characteristics of intraday data have piqued the interest of many as they provide 
a view into price evolution. These characteristics – namely that of volatility, volume, and 
depth – help to illustrate how prices behave and evolve over time. Analyzing and comparing 
these characteristics across markets help us to understand how markets relate and react to 
each other. Hupperets and Menkveld (2002) found that there is a U-shaped difference when 
looking at cross-listed stocks in Amsterdam and New York, so these two markets are not 
perfectly integrated. Froot and Dabora (1999), as well as Werner and Kleidon (1996), found 
evidence that financial markets are not one hundred percent integrated. Lin, Engle, and Ito 
(1994) found that while markets are not integrated, the US movement affects other markets, 
but this effect is asymmetric as it does not occur the other way around. The level of market 
integration is of utmost importance as we live in an ever changing and globalized world. 
Before analysis, the market structure of the markets paired for comparative purposes 
need to have some underlying thread that could explain why these markets would be 
integrated. In the case of London and New York, both of these exchanges are open trading 
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environments with virtually complete access for foreign investors. There are no regulatory 
constraints to prevent cross-border arbitrage in dual listed stocks, and the markets are heavily 
arbitraged by institutional investors. In particular, the LSE has a higher amount of 
institutional investors (Cai, Hudson, & Keasey, 2004). Dual listed stocks are liquid in both 
London and New York trading. Dealers in dual listed stocks potentially face considerable 
cross-Atlantic competition for order flow. London stocks trade on the LSE SETS system, 
which was introduced in 1997. The trading day typically runs from 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. 
London time. However, there is no rigid starting and ending time as trading can begin 
anytime between 8 a.m. and 8:30 a.m. and end anytime between 4 p.m. and 4:30 p.m. This 
time frame translates to 3:00 a.m. to 11:30 a.m., New York time. The NYSE operates from 
9:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., New York time. There is a two-hour overlap – 9:30 a.m. to 11:30 
a.m., New York time – in the trading times for these two exchanges. This overlap allows for 
testing of the impact of macro-economic news and the effects of contagion. In Werner and 
Kleidon (1996), London was not affected by the news from the US, but in a more vertically 
integrated globalised world, the news effect in cross-border relationships ought to be 
significant as shown in Hupperets and Menkveld (2002) as well as in Lin, Engle, and Ito 
(1991). 
Another aspect that has to be taken into account is the frequency of the data. 
Previously, much research used to be done with low frequency data, such as monthly and 
weekly data. However, much information is left out when using low frequency data as 
opposed to intraday data (Goodhart & O'hara, 1997). Since financial markets operate, during 
their opening hours, on a continuous, high frequency basis, then it makes perfect sense that 
studies done on these markets should utilize as high as possible frequency data. It is, 
therefore, only by looking at the highest frequency continuous time series that one could 
observe temporal interrelationships between markets connected by such (arbitrage) 
interrelationships. The intraday pattern is also important to know for traders in these markets. 
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This pattern helps to guide traders when it comes to correct timing to place trades, as well as 
the modeling of price movements, in financial markets. 
Issue one looks at the characteristics of reduced risk basket securities, which trade on 
the domestic NYSE market, by examining ETFs. Diversification reduces risk in a basket of 
securities so that their shape exhibits less volatility than the individual assets that make up 
their portfolios. Therefore, this risk reduction may also be exhibited in the observed intraday 
pattern, and a deviation from the U-shape may occur. This issue is analyzed by considering 
the subsequent question: How much different from stocks is the intraday shape of ETFs when 
characterizing volatility, volume, and depth? I hypothesize that the intraday shapes of 
volume, volatility, and depth of ETFs differ from that of stocks, due to the diversification 
benefits inherent in ETFs. 
Issue two looks at the intraday characteristics of iShares ETFs that are listed on both 
the NYSE and the LSE. If these two were perfectly co-integrated, then they would exhibit a 
stylized shape like the one shown in Figure 2-1. This issue is analyzed by considering the 
questions: Does location of trade matter? Is one market more liquid or volatile than the other? 
Are markets integrated for the overlapping trading period based on their shape? If there is a 
time lag in integration, is it persistent every day, or does it appear randomly? How much does 
US macroeconomic news affect ETF prices in London and vice versa? This series of 
questions leads to the following hypotheses: I hypothesize that markets are not integrated 
over the whole day but show integration in their overlapping period, so location of trade does 
matter. In addition, the lag in integration does not appear randomly, but it is present every day 
in the same interval of time. Furthermore, there is a more powerful effect of economic news 
from the New York to London but not vice versa. 
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2.3 Data and Methodology 
ETFs would provide a good database for studying integration because they are basket 
securities and through diversification have eliminated much of the individual stock risk. 
Therefore, any lapse in integration would represent market specific factors and not those of 
individual stocks. The two markets to be looked at are the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) for nine months of data: September to November 
2008 and June to November 2010. These two markets provide much ETF volume and are a 
good fit for a study on ETFs. The iShares group of ETFs is touted as having the most ETFs 
under management. There are over 300 iShares ETFs being traded in the US while there are 
over 250 being traded in London.  Thus, there is a good amount of ETFs to conduct the 
research. Of that number, 37 are dual listed ETFs.  
 ETFs’ intraday data for the US were readily available on TAQ. TAQ provided the 
bids, asks, and trades of the US ETFs. ETFs’ intraday data for London were available from 
the LSE. The CRSP data files were accessed through WRDS to get an accounting of all the 
US ETFs that were being traded. This list was cross referenced with the TAQ database in 
order to filter out ETFs from the universe of daily traded equities. Additionally, the 
Bloomberg terminal was used to get a list of all iShares ETFs that were traded on the LSE 
and the NYSE. These two lists were merged based on the underlying ETF to result in a list 
depicting iShares ETFs that were traded both in London and in New York (dual listing). 
Concentrating on the intraday activity required excluding any overnight positions. Therefore, 
all observations before the opening of the market – 9:30 a.m. in New York and 8:00 a.m. in 
London – and after the closing of the market at 4:00 p.m. in New York and at 4:30 p.m. in 
London were removed. If the price or volume was equal to zero or negative, then the trade 
was deleted. The data were separated into 15-minute intervals for the analysis. The first 
interval for the New York data was 9:30:01 to 9:44:59 while for the British data, it was 
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8:00:01 to 8:14:59. This time frame resulted in 36, 15-minute intervals for the LSE data and 
27 for the NYSE data. 
Integration is assessed both directly and indirectly – indirectly through the study of 
intraday patterns, which builds on Werner and Kleidon (1996), and directly by modeling 
price discovery during the two overlapping trading hours. For separate markets to be viewed 
as an integrated one, there should be a fusing of their U-shaped pattern instead of two distinct 
U-shapes for each market, so this approach provides a way to indirectly test for integration 
(see Figure 2-1). If markets are not integrated on a whole-day basis, as evidenced by a fused 
U-shape, are they integrated for the two-hour overlapping period? If both price series are co-
integrated, then this finding would be a direct modeling of price discovery. 
The trading variables explored are trade price volatility, volume, and depth. The 
interval return is calculated as log difference between the trade price prevailing at the start of 
the interval as is inferred from the last trade and the prevailing price at the end of the interval. 
The total number of shares traded in each interval is summed up to give the interval trading 
volume. The number of trades in each trading interval is the depth of trades. Intraday patterns 
for volatility, volume, and depth are estimated using ordinary least squares regression. The 
trading variables for each specific day and minute intervals are scaled by the daily mean. 
Similar to Werner and Kleidon (1996), these scaled variables are used in a cross-sectional 
regression in order to arrive at the intraday patterns.  
??,?,?
??,?
= 𝐽𝐽?(𝑡𝑡)𝛼𝛼?
?
???? +    (𝐽𝐽
??
???? (𝑡𝑡)𝜎𝜎?) 𝜀𝜀?,?,?     (1) 
 Y is either volume, volatility or spread, and f is the ETF, d is the day, and t is the 
time interval. δ represents the fund specific, day specific mean. The dummy vector of Ji(t) is a 
{0,1} vector with value of one only when i=t. The error term, εf,d,t is iid with a mean of zero 
and variance of one. The σ vector represents the intraday variance and can be heteroskedastic. 
30 
 
Price differences should be transient for arbitrage reasons and, therefore, stationary. The 
null hypothesis of market integration for price discovery during the overlap is tested by 
evaluating whether or not both price series are co-integrated. The Dickey-Fuller Test is used 
to test for market integration.  If there is high volume and high volatility, there are typically 
large spreads and integrated price discovery. This dynamic suggests that we can discover a 
causal relationship. The vector error correction model proposed by Hasbrouck (1995) is a 
valuable tool to help determine from where this relationship originates.   
The model involves solving the following system of equations 
𝑟𝑟?
? = ∆ log 𝑃𝑃?
?          (2) 
𝑟𝑟?
? = ∆ log 𝑃𝑃?
?         (3) 
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??? 𝑟𝑟???
? + 𝛾𝛾?
?,?𝑟𝑟???
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??? + 𝜀𝜀?
?  (4) 
𝑟𝑟?
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L is London and N is New York 
2.4 Results 
After data collection, the data were summarized to get a general view. Summary 
statistics for both the 2008 and 2010 periods are reported in Table 2-1 for the entire day while 
Table 2-2 depicts the overlapping two-hour period between the NYSE and the LSE. Panel A 
of each table represents the trading in the New York market while Panel B represents the 
trading in the London market.1 The New York panel provides a summary for three different 
groups: all ETFs (ETFs that are actively being traded, regardless of issuer), all iShares ETFs 
(ETFs that are actively traded and issued by iShares) and dual-listed iShares ETFs (ETFs that 
are issued by iShares and traded both in New York and London). The London panel provides 
                                                      
1 Werner and Kleidon (1996) adjust for the impact of exchange rates on the trading variables. 
However, they find that stock prices and exchanges would need to be perfectly negatively correlated in 
order for the impact of exchange rates to skew the results. Since perfect negative correlation has not 
been observed between exchange rates and stock prices, I do not expect any change in results and I do 
not account for the impact of exchange rates.	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a summary for two groups: all iShares ETFs and dual-listed iShares ETFs. Both markets are 
very liquid as observed by the average volume across all groups.  
Table 2-1 illustrates that New York has more ETFs being traded, and that the NYSE 
has more volume and more depth than London. This circumstance may be due to the fact that 
ETFs started to be traded at an earlier date in New York than in London. This observation is 
consistent with the higher average volume per trade in New York that was observed by 
Werner and Kleidon (1996). Regardless of location, the average volume and average depth of 
trade was larger in 2008 than in 2010. In New York, the average trade price volatility was 
larger for the group, all ETFs, in 2010 versus 2008. Conversely, the groups, all iShares ETFs 
and dual-listed iShares ETFs, had more trade price volatility in 2008 than in 2010. For 
London, the average trade price volatility for all iShares ETFs was larger in 2010 than in 
2008, but the opposite was true for the dual-listed iShares ETFs. The amounts traded of these 
shares were larger in 2008 than in 2010. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that volatility 
is higher when volume is higher as more volume means more trading and  more opportunities 
for the deviations of trade prices from the mean. 
Table 2-2 shows similar results to Table 2-1. There is more volume and depth in the 
New York market than in the London market for ETFs in the two-hour overlapping period. 
There are also more volume and depth in both New York and London in 2008 compared to 
2010 for the two-hour overlap. Also, trade price volatility is large in 2008 than in 2010 for all 
of the three groups for the New York market. Regarding trade price volatility in London, 
there is the same relationship in the two-hour overlap as in the whole day, where for the 
group, all iShares ETFs, there is a larger trade price volatility in 2010 compared to 2008. For 
the group, dual-listed iShares ETFs, trade price volatility in 2008 is larger than in 2010. It is 
interesting to note that in comparison to the whole trading day, the two-hour overlapping 
period in both 2008 and 2010 shows that both volume and depth increased across all groups 
regardless of location. Volatility varies slightly as the increase for the overlap compared to 
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the whole day is shown for all groups except all ETFs in New York, where the volatility for 
the day as a whole is larger than the volatility in the two-hour overlap.  This observation 
support the hypothesis that the two-hour overlapping period is distinguished from the entire 
day and creates an ideal time and place for arbitrageurs to trade. 
Panel C of Tables 2-1 and 2-2 reports the t-statistics from the Welch’s difference of 
means test,2 which tests the hypothesis that the means of trade price volatility, volume and, 
depth for New York and London are equal. During the day as a whole, there is generally a 
statistically significant difference in both 2008 and 2010 for all three variables. Trade price 
volatility shows a negative significant difference while volume and depth show a positive 
significant difference in both 2008 and 2010. In other words, the volatility in the London 
market is typically larger than the volatility in New York, but volume and depth are larger in 
the New York market, which translates from Panel A. During the two hour-overlap, the 
variables have the same sign as during the whole day. While volume and depth retain a 
general positive statistical significance, volatility has a statistically significant difference for 
all iShares ETFs but not for the dual-listed iShares ETFs, where there is no significance in 
2008 while there is a weak 10% significance level for 2010. 
The empirical intraday pattern for stocks in the US has been shown to reflect a U-
shape. However, taking into consideration that ETFs are basket securities and thus benefit 
from reduced risk through diversification based on their construction, it is important to first 
construct the intraday patterns for all ETFs in the US to verify that they also follow the U-
shaped intraday patterns recorded for US stocks. The intraday patterns for all ETFs traded on 
the New York market are first established by using the double pass regression from Werner 
and Kleidon (1996). This intraday pattern is shown in Figure 2-2 for both 2008 and 2010. All 
                                                      
2 A non-parametric test, the Wilcoxon rank sum test, was also conducted, and it verifies the results of 
the t-test, rejecting the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative where true location shift was not 
equal to 0 – hence it was not reported here. 
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three variables show a distinct U-shaped pattern in 2008. There are more jumps seen for 
volatility resulting in a departure from the pure U-shape than for the other two variables. In 
2010, while volume and depth show the conceived U-shape, volatility takes a dive in the last 
half hour of trading, and the U-shape becomes slightly distorted. 
Figures 2-3 and 2-4 show the intraday patterns for all iShares ETFs traded in New 
York and London, respectively.  Figure 2-3 illustrates that the iShares ETFs follow a very 
similar intraday pattern to all the ETFs traded in the New York market, validating this group 
as a good choice as vehicle for this study. The pattern shows jumps in similar positions when 
compared to Figure 2-2, although some of these jumps are a tad sharper. The London iShares 
ETFs, on the other hand, in Figure 2- 4 tell a very different story. This pattern resembles 
more of a sideways J shape for volatility and somewhat for volume and depth. The highest 
point seems to be at the end of the day, with oscillations occurring from when trade starts to 
when trade ends. This uptick in trading could be attributed to the opening of the markets in 
New York that occurs in the last two hours of trading in London. However, there are many 
jumps throughout the day to get to the uptick at the end of the day. With the knowledge that 
trading starts in London at 3:30 a.m. (New York time) then transitions to US trading at 9:30 
a.m. (New York time), and then to close at 4:30 p.m. (New York time), these patterns show 
evidence of a non-integrated market as stylized by the disconnected markets in Figure 2-1. 
There is progression throughout the day from 3:30 a.m. (New York time) to 11:30 a.m. (New 
York time) in the London market, but at around 9:30 a.m. (New York time) – when the New 
York market opens – there is an uptick in the patterns. This uptick flows into the New York 
market from the time it opens to a decline in trading during the middle of the day, followed 
by an increase at the end of the day, to close out trading at 4:30 p.m. Therefore, it is 
immensely important to look at the occurrences during the overlapping two-hour period to 
see how these two markets transition. 
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Figures 2-5 and 2-6 report the pattern attributed to the dual-listed iShares ETFs that 
trade both in New York and London. The New York market shows an adherence to the 
established U-shaped pattern that was presented in Figure 2-2 with more pronounced 
deviations/jumps. It can still clearly be observed that there is an uptick at the beginning of 
trading which is larger than the trading in the middle of the day followed by another uptick at 
the end of the day. The London market shows a significant increase in the number of jumps 
throughout the day, especially in 2008. The pattern from Figure 2-6 showing 2008 depicts the 
contribution of increased panic in the worldwide markets through the distortion of the 
patterns. However, 2010 shows a reversion to what looks like the norm for the London 
market.  
Figures 2-7 and 2-8 illustrate the pattern for the dual-listed ETFS that are traded in 
the overlapping two-hour window between the New York and London markets. For the New 
York market, there is a clear decline from the beginning of the period to the end of the period 
for volatility, volume, and depth in both 2008 and 2010. For London in 2008, there is a 
general increase from the beginning of the period to the end of the period for volatility, 
volume, and depth. However, in 2010, volume and depth show a steady increase over the 
period while volatility reverts back to its starting point with several jumps between the 
beginning and the end of the period.  In the London market, there appear to be quite a few 
jumps throughout the day and in the overlapping period. This dynamic renders it difficult to 
ascertain the cause of these jumps, thus measuring the impacts from US news and the 
opening of a new market in the overlap hours.  
It would seem that the US market and the UK market are more integrated or less 
sensitive to one another as compared to, for instance, the Amsterdam market (see Hupperets 
& Menkveld, 2002). Price discovery does not appear to be as distinctive or as easily placed 
when looking at the US and the UK market together because as there no distinctions to 
ascribe to price movements when particular events occur. However, the hypothesis that the 
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US and the UK markets are integrated on a whole-day basis can be rejected as the intraday 
patterns point otherwise.  In order to delve deeper into integration, the overlapping period is 
considered for market integration. The vector error correction model used by Hasbrouck 
(1995) is used to further detail the relationship between these two markets. First, the price 
series for the US and the UK are tested for co-integration. The augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
is conducted, and this shows that both price series are co-integrated of order one and the first 
difference is stationary in the overlapping period at a 99% confidence level. This finding 
implies that both markets are integrated for each stock.  
Table 2-5 presents the results of the vector error correction model. The error term and 
the adjusted R2 for the London market are larger than the error term and the adjusted R2 for 
the New York market. This observation suggests that the London market is more dependent 
on historical information and thus is more impacted by news, such as macro-economic 
information, than the New York market. The magnitude of the R2 is larger in 2010 than in 
2008 for London while remaining relatively constant for the New York market. This 
observation could be an indication of the recovery from the whirlwind of financial activity as 
a result of the worldwide panic in 2008 back to the normal level of activity at the London 
market in 2010. Hence, London is more likely to be impacted by historical events in the US 
than New York is affected by events in the UK. In 2008, the error correction term is 
statistically significant at the 10% level for both New York and London, but in 2010, the 
statistical significance disappears. The returns are significantly positive for London while 
there are significantly negative returns for New York in 2008. Again, this observation seems 
to be a result of the financial meltdown in 2008. In 2010, there appears to be a recovery 
where market information is assimilated within two lags or 30 minutes as this finding is 
statistically significant in both London and New York. The vector error correction results 
imply that there was a rapid adjustment to prices in 2008, which would explain why there was 
wide spread contagion between these two markets. However, in 2010, with the markets 
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stabilized again, the vector error correction estimate is no longer significant, and price 
discovery is not relegated to any one market but moves across both markets accordingly. 
2.5 Conclusion 
Microstructure research has shown the existence of a U-shape in stocks traded on the 
US market. However, no research has looked at the intraday shape of reduced risk basket 
securities like ETFs. Here, we show that although ETFs provide the benefit of reduced risk in 
every share, there still exists the intraday U-shape pattern for ETFs that are traded in New 
York similar to that of stocks for trade price volatility, volume, and depth. Focusing on the 
iShares group of ETFs to analyze integration between markets is fruitful. The New York 
iShares ETFs exhibit a similar U-shape pattern for New York ETFs while the London ETFs 
have a shape that is consistent with what is found in Werner and Kleidon (1996).  
The US and the UK markets are not integrated across the day as a whole, and in the 
overlapping period there seems to be evidence of integration here with limited price 
discovery outside of the financial meltdown of 2008.  
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Figure 2-1: The stylized U-shape for integrated markets.  
The thin lines represent the two individual markets while the thick line represents the hypothesized 
integrated markets. 
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Table 2-1: Summary Statistics of ETFs  
The dates for analysis are September through November 2008 and June through November 2010. 
 2008 2010 
 Volatility Volume Depth Volatility Volume Depth 
Panel A: New York Trading (NY) 
All ETFS       
Mean 5.14e-04 87148 258.9 5.76e-04 42519 115.1 
Std Deviation 1.13e-02 525362 1035.5 2.61e-02 216924 420.5 
First Quartile 1.73e-06 900 4 0 624 3 
Median 1.08e-05 4140 14 1.11e-06 3300 12 
Third Quartile 4.81e-05 23413 100 5.02e-06 18757 68 
#of ETFs 768 768 768 675 675 675 
All iShares ETFS       
Mean 4.21e-05 75108 264.2 3.15e-06 35085 99.2 
Std Deviation 2.65e-04 635742 982.7 9.52e-06 142654 319.1 
First Quartile 1.16e-06 1300 6 9.95e-08 837 4 
Median 7.46e-06 6300 26 6.58e-07 3500 15 
Third Quartile 3.12e-05 27400 131 2.77e-06 14749 55 
# of ETFs 174 174 174 175 175 175 
Dual-listed iShares ETFS       
Mean 3.64e-05 312714 842.7 2.19e-06 127310 239.1 
Std Deviation 1.47e-04 886648 2268 5.83e-06 330086 87.7 
First Quartile 1.08e-06 7274 33 5.42e-08 394 13 
Median 6.85e-06 32100 113 3.89e-07 17632 52 
Third Quartile 2.83e-05 218846 473 1.81e-06 92751 169 
# of ETFs 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Panel B: London Trading (LN) 
All iShares ETFS       
Mean 5.03 e-04 60528 5.23 9.06e-04 25513 4.12 
Std Deviation 1.85 e-02 230918 10.31 8.27e-02 155283 7.75 
First Quartile 2.14 e-07 556 1 0 280 1 
Median 4.12 e-06 3500 2 1.01e-06 1373 2 
Third Quartile 2.55 e-05 21171 4 3.08e-06 8598 4 
# of ETFS 109 109 109 171 171 171 
Dual-listed  iShares 
ETFS 
      
Mean 3.66e-04 29253 3.02 1.27e-04 15424 3.27 
Std Deviation 1.05e-02 164917 3.07 7.91e-03 115923 3.82 
First Quartile 4.26e-07 395 1 0 250 1 
Median 4.33e-06 2675 2 5.01 e-07 1100 2 
Third Quartile 3.85e-05 15034 4 2.51e-06 6124 4 
# of ETFs 28 28 28 42 42 42 
Panel C: Student T-test of Means (NY –LN = 0) 
All iShares ETFs -3.02*** 6.96*** 108.22*** -2.40*** 12.60*** 151.14*** 
Dual-listed iShares ETFs -2.31** 37.44*** 45.40*** -2.14** 51.72*** 66.70*** 
*- significant at the 10% level; **- significant at the 5% level; **- significant at the 1% level 
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Table 2-2: Summary Statistics in the Two-Hour Overlap Period for ETFs  
The dates for analysis are September through November 2008 and June through November 2010. 
 2008 2010 
 Volatility Volume Depth Volatility Volume Depth 
Panel A: New York Trading (NY) 
All ETFS 
Mean 1.16e-04 93741 290.7 9.18e-06 53877 160.31 
Std Deviation 4.91e-03 486648 1127.8 2.91e-05 206657 543.37 
First Quartile 2.03e-06 1000 4 2.96e-07 1000 4 
Median 1.41e-05 4556 14 1.79e-06 4800 17 
Third Quartile 5.73e-05 25601 104 7.30e-06 26626 98 
All iShares ETFS 
Mean 5.75e-05 83276 290.2 4.99e-06 45736 128.41 
Std Deviation 4.51e-04 340324 1029.3 1.06e-05 170585 393.66 
First Quartile 1.56e-06 1473 6 1.96e-07 1100 5 
Median 9.74e-06 7110 26 1.28e-06 4660 18 
Third Quartile 3.87e-05 30645 137.8 5.05e-06 19394 71 
Dual-listed iShares ETFS 
Mean 4.49e-05 356933 975               3.43e-06 178631 338.73 
Std Deviation 2.12e-04 830968.5 2412.2 7.52e-06 395108 755.79 
First Quartile 1.56e-06 9386 39 1.01e-07 5048 17 
Median 8.94e-06 43698 140 7.45e-07 30500 86 
Third Quartile 3.53e-05 270638 542.5 3.35e-06 145388 240 
Panel B: London Trading (LN) 
All iShares ETFS 
Mean 1.23e-03 67611 5.33 1.77e-03 25933 4.61 
Std Deviation 3.18e-02 238697 10.81 1.15e-01 96235 9.53 
First Quartile 5.02e-07 716 1 0 367.5 1 
Median 7.23e-06 4030 2 1.02e-06 1903 2 
Third Quartile 5.09e-05 22873 4 5.05e-06 10000 4 
Dual-listed  iShares ETFS 
Mean 5.05e-04 35587 3.44 3.04e-04 18910 3.39 
Std Deviation 1.32e-02 125073 3.81 1.35e-02 67062 4.576 
First Quartile 1.21e-06 558 1 1.22e-07 392 1 
Median 7.91e-06 4000 2 9.01e-07 1931 2 
Third Quartile 5.89e-05 25000 4 4.42e-06 10000 4 
Panel C: Student T-test of Means (NY –LN = 0) 
All iShares ETFs -2.42*** 4.09*** 63.79*** -1.93** 20.47*** 91.11*** 
Dual-listed iShares ETFs -1.51 25.84*** 27.67***  -1.75* 37.04*** 41.48*** 
*- significant at the 10% level; **- significant at the 5% level; ***- significant at the 1% level 
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A B C 
D E F 
Figure 2-2: Intraday patterns for all New York ETFs for 2008 and 2010.  
The top panels, A, B, C, represent September through November 2008 while the bottom panels, D, E, F, represent June through November 2010. These 
graphs illustrate the results of the regression for the intraday patterns. The dotted line representss the 99% confidence interval. 
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A B C 
D E F 
Figure 2-3: Intraday patterns for all New York  iShares ETFs for 2008 and 2010.  
The top panels, A, B, C, represent September through November 2008 while the bottom panels, D, E, F, represent June through November 2010. These 
graphs illustrate the results of the regression for the intraday patterns. The dotted line represents  the 99% confidence interval. 
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A B C 
D E F 
Figure 2-4: Intraday patterns for all London iShares ETFs for 2008 and 2010.  
The top panels, A, B, C, represent September through November 2008 while the bottom panels, D, E, F, represent June through November 2010. These 
graphs illustrate the results of the regression for the intraday patterns. The dotted line represents the 99% confidence interval. 
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A B C 
D E F 
Figure 2-5: Intraday patterns for dual listed New York iShares ETFs for 2008 and 2010.  
The top panels, A, B, C, represent September through November 2008 while the bottom panels, D, E, F, represent June through November 2010. These graphs 
illustrate the results of the regression for the intraday patterns. The dotted line representss the 99% confidence interval.   
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A B C 
D E F 
Figure 2-6: Intraday patterns for dual listed Londn iShares ETFs for 2008 and 2010.  
The top panels, A, B, C, represent September through November 2008 while the bottom panels, D, E, F, represent June through November 2010. These graphs 
illustrate the results of the regression for the intraday patterns. The dotted line represents the 99% confidence interval. 
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A B C 
D E F 
Figure 2-7: Intraday patterns for all dual-listed New York iShares ETFs in the overlapping period for 2008 and 2010.  
The top panels, A, B, C, represent September through November 2008 while the bottom panels, D, E, F, represent June through November 2010. These graphs 
illustrate the results of the regression for the intraday patterns. The dotted line represents the 99% confidence interval. 
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A B C 
D E F 
Figure 2-8: Intraday patterns for all dual-listed London iShares ETFs in the overlapping period for 2008 and 2010.  
The top panels, A, B, C, represent September through November 2008 while the bottom panels, D, E, F, represent June through November 2010. These graphs 
illustrate the results of the regression for the intraday patterns. The dotted line represents the 99% confidence interval. 
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Table 2-3: Intraday Time Effects from Regression 
The estimates from the regression for the time effect are provided. The parentheses contain the t-statistic that tests 
whether the estimate is significantly different from zero. The model is computed similar to Werner and Kleidon 
(1996) where 
??,?,?
??,?
= 𝐽𝐽?(𝑡𝑡)𝛼𝛼?
?
???? +    (𝐽𝐽
??
???? (𝑡𝑡)𝜎𝜎?) 𝜀𝜀?,?,?   
Y is volume, volatility or spread, and f is the ETF, d is the day, and t is the time interval. δ represents the fund 
specific, day specific mean. The dummy vector of Ji(t) is a {0,1} vector with value of one only when i=t. The error 
term, εf,d,t is iid with a mean of zero and variance of one. The σ vector represents the intraday variance, and can be 
heteroskedastic. 
Panel A: Dual-listed ETFs for the whole day (2008) 
 New York    London   
Time Volatility Volume Depth Time Volatility Volume Depth 
9:30-9:45 1.92(31.32) 2.23(65.88) 1.63(63.00) 8:30-8:45 0.89(5.61) 0.83(5.86) 0.87(15.94 
9:45-10:00 1.37(21.99) 1.36(39.58) 1.31(49.97) 8:45-9:00 1.30(8.13) 0.69(4.83) 0.83(15.01) 
10:00-10:15 1.26(20.07) 1.25(36.09) 1.26(47.61) 9:00-9:15 0.78(5.26) 0.89(6.72) 0.93(18.31) 
10:15-10:30 1.13(17.92) 1.08(31.01) 1.10(41.32) 9:15-9:30 1.01(7.09) 0.77(6.04) 0.87(17.65) 
10:30-10:45 1.15(18.18) 0.98(28.16) 1.03(38.63 9:30-9:45 0.70(4.69) 0.83(6.19) 0.90(17.48) 
10:45-11:00 0.92(14.56) 0.99(28.36) 1.03(38.43) 9:45-10:00 0.69(4.67) 1.32(9.92) 0.95(18.75) 
11:00-11:15 1.00(15.89) 0.97(27.70) 1.01(37.73) 10:00-10:15 0.47(3.34) 0.85(6.68) 1.03(20.99) 
11:15-11:30 0.83(13.11) 0.95(27.32) 0.96(36.03) 10:15-10:30 0.67(4.72) 0.82(6.44) 0.92(18.80) 
11:30-11:45 1.06(16.79) 0.84(24.08) 0.87(32.60) 10:30-10:45 0.54(3.88) 0.92(7.45) 0.98(20.48) 
11:45-12:00 0.63(09.89) 0.80(22.94) 0.84(31.41) 10:45-11:00 0.58(4.06) 0.78(6.07) 0.98(19.72) 
12:00-12:15 0.71(11.19) 0.73(20.80) 0.76(28.33) 11:00-11:15 1.35(9.14) 0.73(5.54) 0.95(18.62) 
12:15-12:30 0.79(12.58) 0.71(20.25) 0.74(27.59) 11:15-11:30 1.19(8.12) 1.01(7.65) 1.09(21.62) 
12:30-12:45 0.60(09.51) 0.65(18.60) 0.72(26.76) 11:30-11:45 1.01(6.89) 1.0(7.49) 0.94(18.42) 
12:45-1:00 0.73(11.54) 0.68(19.42) 0.73(27.18) 11:45-12:00 0.77(5.11) 1.01(7.41) 0.97(18.63) 
1:00-1:15 0.69(10.79) 0.69(19.59) 0.71(26.20) 12:00-12:15 0.53(3.48) 0.99(7.19) 0.97(18.46) 
1:15-1:30 0.93(14.58) 0.69(19.52) 0.76(28.05) 12:15-12:30 0.75(4.67) 0.81(5.59) 0.98(17.70) 
1:30-1:45 0.73(11.49) 0.76(21.52) 0.81(30.07) 12:30-12:45 0.80(5.03) 0.96(6.66) 0.90(16.36) 
1:45-2:00 0.70(10.99) 0.73(20.70) 0.78(28.93) 12:45-1:00 0.59(3.69) 0.96(6.61) 0.90(16.25) 
2:00-2:15 0.84(13.18) 0.78(22.17) 0.86(31.85) 1:00-1:15 0.92(5.82) 0.64(4.53 0.90(16.51) 
2:15-2:30 0.84(13.27) 0.82(23.56) 0.89(33.78) 1:15-1:30 1.37(8.40) 0.95(6.50) 0.92(16.42) 
2:30-2:45 0.79(12.56) 0.80(22.84) 0.88(32.79) 1:30-1:45 1.28(7.88) 1.21(8.47) 0.92(16.64) 
2:45-3:00 0.90(14.26) 0.86(24.75) 0.93(34.72) 1:45-2:00 1.13(7.19) 0.96(6.96) 0.89(16.69) 
3:00-3:15 1.18(08.85) 0.95(27.54) 1.02(38.70) 2:00-2:15 0.92(6.47) 0.85(6.65) 0.92(18.78) 
3:15-3:30 1.07(17.03) 1.08(31.11) 1.13(42.81) 2:15-2:30 1.23(9.51) 0.87(7.45) 1.0(22.39) 
3:30-3:45 1.57(25.45) 1.31(38.22) 1.31(50.22) 2:30-2:45 1.26(9.89) 1.38(12.06) 1.19(27.16) 
3:45-4:00 1.66(23.22) 2.44(61.79) 2.06(68.26) 2:45-3:00 1.54(12.23) 1.39(12.21) 1.11(25.52) 
    3:00-3;15 1.23(10.28) 0.97(8.90) 1.06(25.36) 
    3:15-3:30 1.38(11.16) 1.17(10.49) 1.14(26.42) 
    3:30-3:45 1.25(9.79) 0.98(8.58) 1.09(24.86) 
    3:45-4:00 0.89(7.17) 1.29(11.4) 1.10(25.48) 
    4:00-4:15 0.92(7.88) 1.31(12.41) 1.16(28.78) 
    4:15-4:30 1.43(9.69) 1.47(10.98) 1.29(25.02) 
F-Statistic 275.7 953.7 1514 F-Statistic 53.51 63.75 417.7 
Adjusted R2 0.3223 0.6223 0.7235 Adjusted R2 0.2487 0.2769 0.72 
Std. Error 1.523 0.8431 0.6438 Std. Error 1.797 1.642 0.63 
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Panel B: Dual-listed ETFs for the whole day (2010) 
 New York    London   
Time Volatility Volume Depth Time Volatility Volume Depth 
9:30-9:45 2.29(47.07) 2.61(75.99) 2.39(97.73) 8:30-8:45 1.06(11.57) 0.83(10.67) 0.87(25.02) 
9:45-10:00 2.14(43.20) 1.48(42.44) 1.50(60.58) 8:45-9:00 1.03(11.10) 0.72(9.04) 0.82(23.45) 
10:00-10:15 1.66(33.70) 1.55(44.58) 1.55(62.90) 9:00-9:15 1.17(13.49) 0.75(10.14) 0.89(27.32) 
10:15-10:30 1.43(28.83) 1.18(33.84) 1.18(47.56) 9:15-9:30 0.87(10.42) 0.97(13.64) 1.00(31.95) 
10:30-10:45 1.35(27.32) 1.12(32.17) 1.13(45.91) 9:30-9:45 0.66(8.07) 0.99(14.31) 1.07(34.95) 
10:45-11:00 1.34(27.05) 1.03(29.72) 1.04(41.79) 9:45-10:00 0.68(8.28) 0.88(12.45) 0.98(31.48) 
11:00-11:15 1.03(20.63) 1.07(30.54) 1.08(42.95) 10:00-10:15 0.80(9.51) 0.93(13.01) 0.94(29.62) 
11:15-11:30 1.02(20.38) 0.95(26.80) 0.97(38.45) 10:15-10:30 0.64(7.72) 0.87(12.23) 1.01(32.05) 
11:30-11:45 0.83(16.47) 0.88(24.71) 0.86(33.83) 10:30-10:45 0.61(7.37) 0.93(13.13) 1.05(33.48) 
11:45-12:00 0.79(15.51) 0.79(22.26) 0.77(30.38) 10:45-11:00 0.57(6.87) 1.12(15.62) 1.06(33.41) 
12:00-12:15 0.64(12.64) 0.72(20.24) 0.73(28.72) 11:00-11:15 0.54(6.48) 0.86(12.14) 1.00(32.00) 
12:15-12:30 0.62(12.09) 0.57(16.01) 0.61(23.97) 11:15-11:30 0.54(6.34) 0.88(12.20) 0.95(29.89) 
12:30-12:45 0.59(11.49) 0.61(16.97) 0.63(24.73) 11:30-11:45 0.56(6.33) 0.76(10.05) 0.93(27.67) 
12:45-1:00 0.63(12.25) 0.59(16.32) 0.61(23.71) 11:45-12:00 0.95(10.72) 080(10.60) 0.88(26.27) 
1:00-1:15 0.68(13.32) 0.63(17.48) 0.66(25.76) 12:00-12:15 0.84(9.15) 0.99(12.71) 0.96(27.58) 
1:15-1:30 0.55(10.71) 0.64(17.64) 0.65(25.15) 12:15-12:30 0.68(7.22) 0.89(10.99) 0.94(26.18) 
1:30-1:45 0.70(13.62) 0.58(16.15) 0.60(23.51) 12:30-12:45 0.54(5.55) 0.87(10.51) 0.86(23.55) 
1:45-2:00 0.79(15.46) 0.61(16.96) 0.60(23.63) 12:45-1:00 0.92(9.48) 0.81(9.68) 0.86(23.43) 
2:00-2:15 0.80(15.80) 0.78(21.83) 0.75(29.62) 1:00-1:15 0.94(9.93) 0.86(10.59) 0.84(23.59) 
2:15-2:30 0.81(15.93) 0.67(18.78) 0.75(29.52) 1:15-1:30 1.22(13.37) 1.00(12.97) 0.91(26.45) 
2:30-2:45 0.83(16.40) 0.69(19.36) 0.76(29.82) 1:30-1:45 1.22(13.50) 1.01(13.93) 1.05(31.05) 
2:45-3:00 0.65(12.73) 0.68(18.99) 0.71(28.06) 1:45-2:00 0.75(8.50) 0.79(10.54) 0.91(27.25) 
3:00-3:15 0.80(15.81) 0.71(20.12) 0.75(29.68) 2:00-2:15 0.68(7.99) 0.84(11.55) 0.87(26.93) 
3:15-3:30 0.98(19.56) 0.93(26.36) 0.95(37.76) 2:15-2:30 0.97(12.47) 0.76(11.46) 0.88(30.01) 
3:30-3:45 0.93(18.94) 1.12(32.32) 1.19(48.18) 2:30-2:45 1.12(15.02) 1.06(16.70) 1.07(38.17) 
3:45-4:00 0.84(17.53) 2.39(71.4) 2.20(92.13) 2:45-3:00 1.58(21.35) 1.18(18.70) 1.08(38.62) 
    3:00-3;15 1.50(19.77) 1.21(18.89) 1.16(40.98) 
    3:15-3:30 1.47(19.48) 1.15(17.90) 1.11(39.08) 
    3:30-3:45 0.79(10.6) 1.15(8.21) 1.07(38.12) 
    3:45-4:00 1.08(15.03) 1.25(20.33) 1.16(42.67) 
    4:00-4:15 2.57(36.46) 1.37(23.01) 1.19(45.16) 
    4:15-4:30 1.02(9.66) 2.42(27.07) 1.30(32.95) 
F-Statistic 477.6 1022 1931 F-Statistic 168.50 207.60 1004 
Adjusted R2 0.3099 0.4903 0.6452 Adjusted R2 0.2365 0.2707 0.6431 
Std. Error 1.637 1.15 0.819 Std. Error 1.962 1.693 0.7491 
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Panel C: Dual-listed ETFs for the overlapping period (2008) 
 New York    London   
Time Volatility Volume Depth Time Volatility Volume Depth 
9:30-9:45 1.92(27.14) 2.23(56.77) 1.63(55.31) 2:30-2:45 1.26(9.04) 1.38(11.94) 1.19(24.34) 
9:45-10:00 1.37(19.06) 1.36(34.11) 1.31(43.87) 2:45-3:00 1.54(11.18) 1.39(11.94) 1.11(22.87) 
10:00-10:15 1.26(17.39) 1.25(31.10) 1.26(41.79) 3:00-3;15 1.23(9.40) 0.97(8.82) 1.06(22.73) 
10:15-10:30 1.13(15.53) 1.08(26.72) 1.10(36.28) 3:15-3:30 1.38(10.20) 1.17(10.38) 1.14(23.68) 
10:30-10:45 1.15(15.76) 0.98(24.27) 1.03(33.91) 3:30-3:45 1.25(8.96) 0.98(8.50) 1.09(22.29) 
10:45-11:00 0.92(12.62) 0.99(24.44) 1.03(33.74) 3:45-4:00 0.90(6.55) 1.29(11.3) 1.10(22.84) 
11:00-11:15 1.00(13.77) 0.97(23.87) 1.01(33.13) 4:00-4:15 0.92(7.21) 1.31(12.29) 1.17(25.8) 
11:15-11:30 0.83(11.36) 0.95(23.54) 0.96(31.63) 4:15-4:30 1.43(8.86) 1.48(10.87) 1.29(22.43) 
F-Statistic 296.2 1047 1554 F-Statistic 80.9 110.8 531.4 
Adjusted R2 0.3338 0.6395 0.7247 Adjusted R2 0.2833 0.35 0.7191 
Std. Error 1.757 0.9873 0.7333 Std. Error 1.97 1.66 0.7028 
        
Panel D: Dual-listed ETFs for the overlapping period (2010) 
 New York    London   
Time Volatility Volume Depth Time Volatility Volume Depth 
9:30-9:45 2.30(35.04) 2.61(63.95) 2.39(82.30 2:30-2:45 1.12(11.19) 1.06(15.38) 1.07(34.70) 
9:45-10:00 2.14(32.16) 1.48(35.71) 1.50(51.01 2:45-3:00 1.58(15.89) 1.18(17.23) 1.08(35.1) 
10:00-10:15 1.66(25.09) 1.55(37.51) 1.55(52.97) 3:00-3;15 1.50(14.72) 1.21(17.41) 1.16(37.24) 
10:15-10:30 1.43(21.46) 1.18(28.48) 1.18(40.05) 3:15-3:30 1.47(14.50) 1.15(16.49) 1.11(35.52) 
10:30-10:45 1.35(20.34) 1.12(27.07) 1.13(28.66) 3:30-3:45 0.79(7.89) 1.15(16.78) 1.07(34.65) 
10:45-11:00 1.34(20.14) 1.03(25.01) 1.04(35.19) 3:45-4:00 1.08(11.19) 1.25(18.73) 1.16(38.79) 
11:00-11:15 1.03(15.36) 1.07(25.70) 1.08(36.17) 4:00-4:15 2.57(27.14) 1.37(21.20) 1.19(41.05) 
11:15-11:30 1.02(15.17) 0.95(22.55) 0.97(32.38) 4:15-4:30 1.02(7.19) 2.42(24.94) 1.30(29.95) 
F-Statistic 579.6 1264 2359 F-Statistic 207.3 324.8 1235 
Adjusted R2 0.3462 0.5362 0.6834 Adjusted R2 0.2385 0.3233 0.6445 
Std. Error 2.2 1.367 0.9726 Std. Error 2.635 1.838 0.8242 
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Table 2-4: Correlations of trade price returns during the overlapping two-hour period 
This table contains the auto-correlations and cross-correlations of dual listed iShares ETFs for the two-hour overlapping trading period between New York and 
London for the periods September  through November 2008 and June through November 2010. 
 2008 2010 
 New York London New York London 
Auto-correlations     
15 minutes 0.153 -0.026 0.183 0.001 
30 minutes -0.059 0.021 0.020 -0.004 
Cross-correlations     
New York lagged     
15 minutes -0.021  0.023  
30 minutes 0.008  -0.009  
London lagged     
15 minutes  -0.008  0.004 
30 minutes  0.011  -0.010 
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Table 2-5: Vector Error Correction Results 
The results from the Vector Error Correction Model are presented here. The t-statistic is shown in parentheses. The model is computed as: 
𝑟𝑟?
? = ∆ log 𝑃𝑃?
?  
𝑟𝑟?
? = ∆ log 𝑃𝑃?
?  
𝑟𝑟?
? = 𝛼𝛼?(log 𝑃𝑃???
? − log  (𝑃𝑃???
? )) + 𝛾𝛾?
?,?
?
???
𝑟𝑟???
? + 𝛾𝛾?
?,?𝑟𝑟???
?
?
???
+ 𝜀𝜀?
? 
𝑟𝑟?
? = 𝛼𝛼?(log 𝑃𝑃???
? − log  (𝑃𝑃???
? )) + 𝛾𝛾?
?,?
?
???
𝑟𝑟???
? + 𝛾𝛾?
?,?𝑟𝑟???
?
?
???
+ 𝜀𝜀?
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Panel A: 2008 
 New York lags London lags     
 PNY-PLN  -15 -30 -15 -30 n Adj R2 Std Error 
New York -0.0001 -0.2254 -0.2469 0.0011 0.0023 3281 0.1198 0.0044 
 (-1.71) (-12.908) (-20.328) (0.224) (0.436)    
London 0.0005 0.0846 0.0501 -0.6296 -0.4974 3281 0.2981 0.0158 
 (1.845) (1.35) (1.149) (-36.382) (-26.843)    
 
Panel B: 2010 
 New York lags   London lags     
 PNY-PLN  -15 -30 -15 -30 n Adj R2 Std Error 
New York 0.000009 -0.2483 -0.2099 0.0002 0.0004 11363 0.11 0.0010 
 (0.977) (-26.461) (-33.879) (0.618) (0.541)    
London 0.000078 0.1556 0.2294 -1.64 -1.96 11363 0.77 0.0217 
 (0.386) (0.745) (1.664) (-184.78) (-127.41)    
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 CHAPTER 3: ETF: LEVERAGE AND LIQUIDITY 
3.1 Introduction 
Liquidity is essential to the efficient functioning of financial markets as investors are 
assured of timely execution of their trades. Moreover, the increased importance of algorithmic 
traders has altered the liquidity in many markets, often affecting the quantities available at any 
time of trading. I examine the liquidity of the ETF market, including leveraged and inverse ETFs, 
with the leveraged and unleveraged ETFs potentially possessing different types of market 
microstructure behavior. In addition, I examine the effect of leverage on liquidity by comparing 
the change in the bid-ask spread and depth for leveraged and unleveraged ETFs. More 
specifically, does depth diminish and bid-ask spread increase as leverage increases? Thus, this 
chapter will advance the literature for the understanding of unleveraged and leveraged ETFs by 
examining their differences with respect to liquidity.  
An extremely volatile day should amplify the effects of leverage on liquidity according to 
Goodhart and O'Hara (1997). Cheng and Madhavan (2009) also allude to the liquidity effects on 
leveraged ETFs being more pronounced when liquidity is low and volatility is high. However, 
previous studies have only focused on the long-term performance of leveraged ETFs and their 
associated path-dependence (Lu, Wang, & Zhang, 2009; Avellaneda & Zhang, 2009), instead of 
the effect of volatility or the intraday profiles of leveraged ETFs. Therefore, here I examine two 
periods, one of relatively normal volatility and the other of relatively high volatility to see the 
impact that leverage has on spread and depth when comparing leveraged and unleveraged ETFs. 
On an aggregate basis, the bid-ask spreads for positive multiples tend to be larger than those of 
negative multiples, but the double-leveraged ETFs, whether positive or negative, have the largest 
spreads (Cheng & Madhavan, 2009). Since hedging demands for leveraged ETFs differ based on 
the sign and the size of the multiple then do leveraged ETFs differ in liquidity based on the sign 
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and the size of the multiple in a linear fashion? In this chapter, I examine the spread and depth of 
the leveraged ETFs disaggregated by the leverage multiple using 15-minute intervals.    
There is a distinct difference in liquidity displayed between leveraged and unleveraged 
ETFs in periods of normal volatility as well as in periods of high volatility. This difference is 
noticeable in both spread and depth when looking at leveraged ETFs on an aggregate basis as 
well as when leveraged ETFS are decomposed by leveraged multiples. When leveraged ETFs are 
segregated into multiples, this difference is also displayed. This difference is more pronounced in 
periods of high volatility than in periods of normal volatility. 
The rest of the chapter is divided into the following sections: 3.2 – literature survey and 
hypothesis, 3.3 – data and methodology, 3.4 – results, and 3.5 – conclusion. 
3.2 Literature Survey and Hypothesis 
Leveraged ETFs are a new ETF product approved by the SEC, but relatively little is 
known about this new breed of ETFs. These ETFs are fashioned as long or short products to 
produce a return that is a multiple of the underlying benchmark portfolio. This multiple is either 
+3 times or +2 times the daily return of the underlying benchmark for long leveraged ETFs, 
whereas short or inverse leveraged ETFs have multiples of -3, -2, or -1 times that of the 
underlying benchmark return. The managers use swaps, derivatives, and rebalancing in order to 
attain these leveraged returns.3 Leveraged ETFs in the USA are originated by three different 
companies – ProShares, Rydex, and Direxion. ProShares started the leveraged ETF revolution by 
distributing the first leveraged ETF in 2006. There are about 146 leveraged ETFs being actively 
traded on US exchanges, with assets of over 30 billion dollars. In the recent downturn in financial 
markets, these leveraged products have seen great increases in volume, and they account for a 
substantial part of the overall growth of ETFs.  
                                                      
3 Swaps are often the derivatives chosen to achieve the leveraged multiple, since swaps avoid the strictures 
and standards associated with the more regularized derivatives (Cheng & Madhavan, 2009) 
54 
 
Leveraged ETFs have received negative publicity in terms of their associated risks, i.e., 
the leveraged ETF may not generate the expected multiple of return expected over the long term 
(Stanley, 2009; Canadian Foundation for Advancement of Investors Rights, 2009; Justice, 2009). 
These warnings are based on the path-dependence of the leveraged ETFs as well as the leveraged 
ETFs’ ability to magnify the movements of the underlying benchmark. Given that these leveraged 
products vary so significantly from the previously introduced ETFs, it is important to 
policymakers, investors, and investment managers to have a clear picture of the liquidity aspects 
of these funds in both normal and highly volatile times. Thus, generating the expected return of 
leveraged ETFs involves a major problem in that their exposure is rebalanced on a daily basis in 
order to maintain the exposure level to the correct multiple. This frequent rebalancing can prove 
quite costly as rebalancing is initiated based on the upward or downward movement of the index.4 
However, this issue is outside the scope of this study.  
Leverage is an important factor in financial markets, but one that is often ignored or 
relegated to secondary importance. Financial leverage is important to investors who utilize 
margin to trade, and it is just as important to companies that utilize leverage in order to maintain 
their day-to-day operations.5 Similarly, leverage (as in leveraged ETFs) is important as it 
magnifies returns, and therefore it becomes a significant factor to consider when volatility exists. 
However, just as leverage can exhibit a magnification result, a lack of liquidity can also magnify 
the effect of other factors. Black (1975) posited that leverage is instrumental for the decision-
making of investors who choose between option investing and equity investing. These investors 
                                                      
4 This cost shows up as increased commissions for managers of leveraged ETFs compared to managers of 
unleveraged ETFs. Moreover, the cost is impounded into long-term returns, where compounding shows 
much divergence in the returns from the leverage multiple. 
5 An investor who uses margin to trade may be required to put an initial margin of 50% of their own money 
in order to trade. If the price of the stock increases by 50%, then the investor would have a holding period 
return of 100% on his or her initial investment (not accounting for any interest payment). Hence the 
investor had his or her returns magnified by 2 due to leverage.	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tend to make the choice to conduct transactions in the derivatives markets based on the power of 
leverage. However, unlike the futures market, where the downside loss is theoretically 
unrestricted, in the leveraged ETF markets investors only end up losing their investment in the 
leveraged ETF. Thus, investors would be more inclined to invest in leveraged ETFs that can give 
them leveraged returns, provide some exposure to the derivatives’ markets, and also restrict 
losses to the amount invested, rather than other financial securities without those benefits (Little, 
2010). These benefits could help explain the sharp increase in leveraged ETFs’ trading activity in 
the short time since inception.  
 Factors affecting ETFs include maintaining the leverage multiple by daily 
rebalancing and the effect of high volatility contributing to the deviation between the returns of 
the leveraged ETFs and the returns of the underlying benchmark portfolio over time (Cheng & 
Madhavan, 2009). These factors impact on the ownership costs of leveraged ETFs versus 
unleveraged ETFs. Unleveraged ETFs do not need daily rebalancing; therefore, they do not have 
the transaction costs associated with that activity.6 Cheng and Madhavan (2009) illustrate that the 
volatility of leveraged ETFs is a function of both the leverage multiplier and the volatility of the 
underlying index. In addition, volatility in the underlying index affects both leveraged and 
unleveraged ETFs; however, the leverage multiplier inherent in leveraged ETFs affects the 
leveraged ETFs more than the underlying ETF (Cheng & Madhavan, 2009;  Stanley, 2009; 
Guiese, 2010).   Since leveraged ETFs are designed to match the return of the underlying 
benchmark to a specified multiple of its value, then it stands to reason that anything that affects 
the underlying benchmark will also affect a product based on it.  
The path-dependence of leveraged ETFs and its effect on return over a period greater 
than a day has been noted by several authors (Avellaneda & Zhang, 2009; Cheng & Madhavan, 
                                                      
6 Expense ratios are the costs to investors, but funds have transaction costs due to daily rebalancing with 
total return swaps. These transaction costs would diminish the fund’s return and cumulate over time. 
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2009; Guiese, 2010; Liu, 2009). In fact, path-dependence is largely blamed for the deviation 
between the leveraged ETFs’ long-run return and that of its underlying benchmark portfolio. 
However, liquidity constraints in financial markets and their effect on leveraged returns have not 
been examined as an alternative solution to this deviation in return.  Spread and depth should both 
be considered as previous research such as Bessembinder and Seguin (1993) show that when 
depth is high, then volatility is low. Therefore, liquidity changes in the bid-ask spread and depth 
should also affect the long-run return on leveraged ETFs and factor in the deviation between the 
leveraged ETF return and the underlying index.  
The fact that leveraged ETFs do not perform well in comparison to their underlying 
benchmarks with large tracking errors has been further noted (Liu, 2009; Lu, Wang, & Zhang, 
2009). Most prospectuses from leveraged ETF issuers caution that these funds should not be held 
for over a day: “The return of each Fund for periods longer than a single day, especially in 
periods of market volatility, may be completely uncorrelated to the return of the Fund’s 
benchmark for such longer periods” (Direxion prospectus). However, most investors hold these 
funds for longer lengths of periods. Therefore, the cumulated volatility gyrations will severely 
impact these investors since this volatility does not magnify the long-term movements of the 
leveraged ETFs in their portfolios as assumed by investors. Volatility is one of the reasons given 
for the resulting path-dependence and variation from the underlying benchmark in the long run 
(Avellaneda & Zhang, 2009). The underperformance will be notably higher in high volatility 
periods, and this trend will be exhibited in a loss of liquidity.7  
The lack of liquidity in financial markets causes issues such as unmatched trades and 
poor execution time. Leverage, especially financial leverage, has been shown in both corporate 
finance and investments to cause magnification.  Studying both of these effects together to 
                                                      
7 Bessembinder and Seguin (1993) find a negative relationship between liquidity and volatility. 
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observe the impact on financial instruments is phenomenal. Leveraged ETFs make a good 
candidate for this type of study as there is a built-in control group of unleveraged ETFs and thus 
liquidity and leverage can be analyzed together. The analysis of the impact of leverage on 
liquidity using leveraged and unleveraged exchange traded funds provides important insights into 
market microstructure. Leveraged and unleveraged ETF returns can significantly deviate from 
one another in the long run; however, these dynamics in the short run are not well documented.  If 
there is a significant difference in the spread between leveraged and unleveraged ETFs, then more 
costs would be incurred by investors. Moreover, a decrease in depth would result in more 
volatility. In order to examine the effect of leverage on spread and depth, I propose the following 
hypotheses based on the literature surveyed: 
Hypothesis One: During highly volatile markets, the differences in depth between 
leveraged and unleveraged ETFs will become larger relative to times of normal volatility.  More 
volatile market periods will result in higher bid-ask spreads for all ETFs. In addition, the 
leveraged ETFs’ bid-ask spreads will increase more than the unleveraged ETFs’ spreads. 
Hypothesis Two: The leveraged ETFs’ bid-ask spread is consistent with a multiple of the 
associated unleveraged ETF on an intra-day basis for periods of normal volatility. Alternatively, 
in periods of abnormal volatility, the bid-ask spreads between the two types of ETFs are not 
aligned with the leverage multiple. 
Hypothesis Three: The leveraged ETFs’ bid-ask spread and depth will differ based on the 
leveraged multiple and will progress in a linear fashion based on the size and sign of the 
leveraged multiple. 
3.3 Data and Methodology 
I employ data from the TAQ database for the Direxion, Ryder, and Proshares families of 
leveraged ETFs and their corresponding unleveraged ETFs. The unleveraged ETF is 
characterized as 1x, whereas long leveraged ETFs are characterized as 2x and 3x, depending on 
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the leveraged multiple of two or three times the index return. Short leveraged ETFs are 
characterized as -1x, -2x, and -3x, depending on the inverse leveraged multiple and its relation to 
the underlying index. For each long leveraged ETF, there is a matching inverse leveraged ETF, 
except for the leveraged multiplier of -1x, which has no corresponding long pair (as the group of 
1x ETFs encompasses the unleveraged ETFs). The entire universe of unleveraged ETFs is not 
used as only those unleveraged ETFs that have the same underlying index as the leveraged ETFs 
are included in the group of 1x. 
First, two groups of 15 days each are formed. One group represents 15 days of normal 
volatility, and the other group represents 15 days of high/abnormal volatility. These groups are 
determined by finding the Garman-Klass daily volatility estimator for the S&P 500 index from 
September 2008 through May 2010.8   The Garman and Klass (1980) volatility estimator is 
computed as: 
  𝜎𝜎??
? = 0.5(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
??
??
)? − (2 ln 2 − 1) 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
??
??
?
 
 Hi and Li represent the daily high price and low price, respectively  
Ci and Oi represent the daily closing price and opening price, respectively 
The daily volatility estimators are then sorted from largest to smallest, and the 15 days 
with the median daily volatility are assigned to the normal volatility group. In contrast, the 15 
days with the largest daily volatility estimators (except for the Flash Crash of May 6, 2011) are 
assigned to the abnormal volatility group.9   
                                                      
8 The Garman-Klass volatility estimator was used as it has been documented as one of the most robust 
volatility estimators (Daigler & Wiley, 1999; Chen, Daigler, & Parhizgari, 2006). 
 
9 Group Normal consisted of 09/24/08, 01/27/09, 01/29/09, 02/09/09, 02/13/09, 04/27/09, 05/14/09, 
05/22/09, 06/24/09, 07/16/09, 08/07/09, 11/04/09, 12/03/09, 01/20/10 and 05/10/10. Group High/Abnormal 
consisted of 09/18/08, 10/06/08, 10/07/08, 10/09/08, 10/10/08, 10/14/08, 10/16/08, 10/17/08, 10/22/08, 
10/23/08, 10/28/08, 11/13/08, 11/20/08, 11/21/08, 12/05/08. 
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In order to eliminate possible errors in the data, we employ the following data tests. If the 
bid or ask size is negative, the ask is less than the bid, or the depth equals zero, then the quote is 
deleted.  For the remaining data, the inside quote and the cumulated depth are calculated for each 
second. The inside quotes from each exchange are used to obtain the national best bid and offer 
(nbbo).The depth, however,  is calculated by summing the bid and ask sizes for the quotes at the 
nbbo price. The characteristics of both the leveraged and unleveraged ETFs are examined to 
determine the effect of leverage on liquidity. For each group, the characteristics of the average 
spread and depth are computed and compared for all the ETFs in our sample. The variables 
explored are the spread, quoted spread, log spread, quote slope, percentage spread, bid size, and 
ask size. The variables are calculated as follows: 
Spread (Sit) = Ait – Bit 
 Quoted spread (QSpit) = (Ait – Bit)/2 
Log spread (LSit) = log(Ait/Bit) 
Quote slope (QSlit) = (Ait-Bit)/(log(ASit)+log(BSit) 
Percent spread (PSit) = ((Ait – Bit)/((Ait + Bit)/2))*100 
Where Ait is the national best ask for each ETF (i) and time interval (t); Bit is the national 
best bid for each ETF (i) and time interval (t); ASit is the ask size for each ETF (i) and time 
interval (t); and BSit is the bid size for each ETF (i) and time interval l(t). 
The nbbo data are aggregated into 15-minute intervals and then winsorized by 0.5% at 
both ends of the daily 15-minute intervals in order to remove outliers. A realistic microstructure 
picture of the ETFs’ characteristics is then obtained for each trade variable. The 15-minute mean 
for each 15-minute interval for each day for the entire period for volatile and normal days by 
multiple is calculated and used to represent each interval and to eliminate microstructure issues 
such as bid-ask bounce. The exploration of relationships between the ETFs is conducted by 
performing both univariate and multivariate analyses on this dataset. For univariate analysis, a 
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difference of means t-test is computed to look at the differences between high and normal 
volatility for the different groups of ETFs. The t-test is conducted assuming both equal and 
unequal variances. The hypothesis being test is 
H0: µ1- µ2 = µd =0   
H1: µd ≠ 0   
which is estimated by yd= ybar1 – ybar2. The estimate for common standard deviation is 
calculated under both assumptions about the variance. Under the assumption that the variances 
are equal, the test is carried out by using the following 
Pooled (sp) = 
???? ??
??(????)??
?
???????
?
?
;  
Pooled standard error (SEp) = 𝑠𝑠?
?
??????
??
???
+
?
??????
??
???
?
?
 
Pooled t-statistic (tp) = 
?????
???
 
Pooled P-value = 𝑃𝑃 𝑡𝑡?? > 𝐹𝐹???,?,???????  
Under the assumption that the variances are not equal, the test is carried out using the 
following 
Unpooled (SEu) = 
??
?
??????
??
???
+
??
?
??????
??
???
?
?
 
Sattherwaite’s estimated dfu = 
????
??
?
(????) ???
??
??? ???
?
??
?
(????) ???
??
??? ???
 
Unpooled t-statistic (tu) = 
?????
???
 
61 
 
Unpooled P-value = 𝑃𝑃 𝑡𝑡?? > 𝐹𝐹???,?,???  
A test for equality of variance between the two periods for the same multiple is also 
conducted. Here, we assume that the data are normally distributed and a two-tailed F test is 
conducted under the null hypothesis that σ12= σ22.  The test is carried out by using the folded form 
of the F Statistic, F’. 
F’ = ???  (??
?,??
?)
???  (??
?,??
?)
 
The Jonckheere-Terpstra test for ordered alternatives, a non-parametric test for ordered 
differences among classes, is also used to test between the different groups. This test is used 
because no assumptions about the distribution of the quotes have to be made. In other words, it 
serves as a robustness check to confirm the results of the t-test. It tests the null hypothesis that the 
distribution of the response variable does not differ among classes and is designed to detect 
alternatives of ordered class differences, where τ1 ≤ τ2 ≤ … ≤ τk. The test is carried out using the 
following procedure: 
The test-statistic J* = (𝐽𝐽 − 𝐸𝐸? 𝐽𝐽 )/ 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣?𝐽𝐽   
𝐸𝐸? 𝐽𝐽 =    𝑛𝑛? − 𝑛𝑛?
?
? /4 
𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣? 𝐽𝐽 =
?
??
+
?
??? ??? ???
+
?
?? ???
  
A  = 𝑛𝑛 𝑛𝑛 − 1 2𝑛𝑛 + 5 − 𝑛𝑛?. 𝑛𝑛? − 1 2𝑛𝑛? + 5 − 𝑛𝑛.? 𝑛𝑛.? − 1 2𝑛𝑛.? + 5??   
 𝐵𝐵 = 𝑛𝑛?. 𝑛𝑛?. − 1 𝑛𝑛?. − 2? 𝑛𝑛.? 𝑛𝑛.? − 1 𝑛𝑛.? − 2?   
 C= 𝑛𝑛?. 𝑛𝑛?. − 1? 𝑛𝑛.? 𝑛𝑛.? − 1?  
where Eo(J) is the expected value and varo(J) is the variance of the test statistic under the 
null hypothesis. 
When the standardized test statistic is greater than the null hypothesis of 0, the right-sided 
value is displayed, which is the probability of a larger value of the statistic occurring under the 
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null hypothesis. A small right-sided p-value supports the alternative hypothesis of increasing 
order from row 1 to row k. P = Prob(Z>J*) if J*>0 or  Prob(Z<J*) if J*≤ 0 or Prob(|Z|>|J*|), where 
Z is distributed as standard normal. 
Panel regressions are conducted to understand the liquidity components of the ETFs. 
Intraday patterns for depth and bid-ask spread are estimated using ordinary least squares 
regression. These regressions are conducted with dummy variables for the leveraged multiple in 
order to ascertain the effect of leverage. The linear equation used in the regression is 
𝑌𝑌?? = 𝛼𝛼?? + 𝛽𝛽?𝜎𝜎?? + 𝛽𝛽?𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇?? + 𝛽𝛽?𝐿𝐿??
?
???
+ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶?? + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇?? + 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸?? 
where σit represents the ith volatility (of each trading variable) of the time interval t; TOit 
represents the ith turnover of the time interval t – TOit=Volumeit/Shares outstanding; Lit 
represents the ith leverage dummy variable for each leverage multiple -1, -2, -3, 2, 3 at each time 
interval t. The error terms are decomposed into CSVit – the variance component attributed to 
cross section, TSVit – the variance component attributed to time series, and Errit – the error 
variance component. The equality of the individual regression coefficients obtained from the 
leveraged dummy variables is then tested using the Welch test. This test is calculated using a 
BLUE estimator of β, βhat*.  
βhat* = 𝑤𝑤?𝛽𝛽ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎????? / 𝑤𝑤?????  , where the wi are the corresponding weights of βhat. 
The Welch statistic, W = 
??????????
∗
??
?
?
??? ???
??
????
????
?
????
??
?
??
?
? ??
??
???
?
???
  
In the case where the comparison is only between two betas, this relationship can be 
shown to reduce to a simplified z statistic where 𝑍𝑍 =   
?????
???
?????
?
. 
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3.4 Results 
The three hypotheses require an analysis that compares both the abnormally high and 
normal volatility time as well as leveraged and unleveraged ETFs. Furthermore, an unaggregated 
look at leveraged ETFs is required to see the response of different leveraged multiples in 
abnormally high and normal volatility times. In order to arrive at a conclusion regarding these 
three hypotheses, we start off with univariate tests to compare the high and normal volatility 
times. Hypothesis One states that during highly volatile markets, the differences in depth between 
leveraged and unleveraged ETFs will become larger relative to times of normal volatility while 
Hypothesis Two states that more volatile market periods will result in higher bid-ask spreads for 
all ETFs; moreover, the leveraged ETFs’ bid-ask spreads will increase more than the unleveraged 
ETFs’ spreads. Hypothesis Three states that the leveraged ETFs’ bid-ask spread and depth will 
differ based on the leveraged multiple and will progress in a linear fashion based on the size and 
sign of the leveraged multiple.  
Table 3-1 provides the descriptive statistics for the liquidity and depth variables: Spread 
(Panel A), Log Spread (Panel B), Quote Slope (Panel C), Percentage Spread (Panel D), Bid Size 
(Panel E) and Ask Size (Panel F). They were accumulated over each 15-day period for the normal 
and abnormally high volatility group.10  The results are sequenced into three different groups for 
comparative purposes: All ETFs, Leveraged ETFs, and Unleveraged ETFs. For the liquidity 
variables:  Spread, Log Spread, Quote Slope. and Percentage Spread, it is apparent that there is a 
distinct difference when comparing normal volatility to abnormally high volatility for all three 
groups, where mean liquidity increases substantially in abnormally high volatility when 
benchmarked against normal volatility regardless of the time of day. This distinct difference is 
also apparent for the depth variables: Ask size and Bid size. The mean depth decreases in 
                                                      
10 The data are winsorized at .5% in each 15-minute interval to remove outliers, and the winsorized mean 
and standard error are computed for each liquidity and depth variable. The standard errors are small for 
each 15-minute interval, so they were not reported in the table. 
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abnormally high volatility in comparison to normal volatility regardless of the time of day. This 
finding lends support to Hypothesis One and Two. 
The graphs depicted in Figures 3-1 and 3-2 confirm these findings and suggest the 
confirmation of Hypotheses One and Two. Figure 3-1 shows all the liquidity variables in 
abnormally high volatility while Figure 3-2 shows all the liquidity variables in normal volatility 
for the three groups : All ETFs, Leveraged ETFs, and Unleveraged ETFs. Both figures show that 
leveraged ETFs have bigger spreads than the unleveraged ETFs, irrespective of time, throughout 
the day. The converse is true for depth variables in high volatility as unleveraged ETFs have the 
bigger size. On the other hand, in normal volatility, the sizes of depth variables for the leveraged 
and unleveraged ETFs are very similar.  
Since there appears a distinct difference of means between leveraged and unleveraged 
ETFs, it would be interesting to note if there is a difference in the decomposed leveraged ETFs 
into the different leveraged multiples, -3, -2, -1, 2 and 3. Table 3-2 reports the summary statistics 
for the liquidity and depth variables in abnormally high volatility and normal volatility by 
leveraged multiple. The means for the negative leveraged multiples for the liquidity variables in 
high volatility are larger than those for the positive leveraged multiples. The largest leverage 
multiple is that for multiple -2. There does not seem to be a clear indication of the mean getting 
bigger as the multiple gets smaller since the multiples -2 and 2 have the biggest means. This 
finding leads to the suggestion of a humped shaped distribution as one goes from the largest 
multiple, 3, to the smallest multiple, -3. This observation might be due to the relative newness of 
the leveraged ETFs with a multiple of 3, whereas the leveraged ETFs with a multiple of 2 have 
been around the longest and have the most ETFs in that category.  
Conversely, the depth variables in high volatility exhibit larger means for the positive 
leveraged multiples as opposed to the negative leveraged multiples. Both the ask size and the bid 
size tend to be largest for leveraged multiple 3 and smallest for leveraged multiple -3. Again, 
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there seems to be a repeat of the humped distribution exhibited by the liquidity variables when 
moving from the largest leveraged multiple, positive 3, to the smallest leveraged multiple, 
negative 3. The distribution of the variables in normal volatility appears to have a different shape 
from the distribution shape in high volatility. There does not appear to be much difference 
between the leveraged multiples of -3, -1, 2, and 3 with only -2 showing any remarkable 
deviation from the pack. However, the size of the spread changes considerably compared to that 
in high volatility. The liquidity variables have a much smaller size in normal volatility. In normal 
volatility, the size of the depth variables grow with the negative multiples from smallest to 
largest, where -1 has the smallest size, and -3 has the largest size. The largest size overall is 
attributed to 2, unlike the liquidity variables that have -2 as the largest size. Figure 3-3 shows all 
the liquidity variables in abnormally high volatility while Figure 3-4 shows all the liquidity 
variables in normal volatility for the leveraged ETFs by multiples  -3, -2, -1, 2, and 3. Figures 3-3 
and 3-4 confirm the findings depicted in the tables as the variables have less distinction between 
multiples in normal volatility versus in high volatility. 
There is a need for difference of the means tests to statistically confirm the appearances 
of the differences between the groups as shown in the tables. The results of the difference of the 
means test for the liquidity and depth variables by leveraged multiples are shown in Table 3. The 
difference of the means tests where normal volatility is subtracted from high volatility confirms 
the previous findings. All the tests are statistically significant at a 1% level, indicating there is a 
difference between the liquidity and depth variables when volatility is a factor. This is consistent 
with Hypotheses One and Two, which suggest a significant difference to leveraged and 
unleveraged ETFs based on whether there is a highly volatile period or a relatively normal period. 
As the difference of the means test assumes a normal distribution, the distribution free test 
provided by Jonckheere-Terpstra (JT) is conducted to corroborate that of the difference of the 
means test. The JT test for ordered alternatives, a non-parametric test for ordered differences 
66 
 
among classes, tests the null hypothesis that the distribution of the response variable does not 
differ among classes and is designed to detect alternatives of ordered class differences, where τ1 ≤ 
τ2 ≤ … ≤ τk. Table 3-4 reports the results of the JT test. The results illustrate that the JT test is 
highly significant for the liquidity and depth variables. 
Multivariate panel regressions were conducted by looking at the impact that leveraged 
multiples had on the liquidity variables. Other variables were added into the regression to provide 
a more complete picture. These variables were Turnover (TO) and Volatility (Vol). The results 
are presented in Table 3-5. There are distinct differences noted between the leveraged variables 
with the leveraged multiple -2 having the largest impact. It does not seem that the impact of the 
leveraged multiples occurs in a linear fashion with -3 having the biggest impact. If that was the 
case, then the leveraged impact would decrease in a linear fashion commensurate with the 
leveraged multiple. This result might be related to the number of ETFs in each category as the 
ETFs with a leveraged multiple of -2 have the most ETFs and have been around the longest. In 
order to analyze the regression coefficients based on leveraged multiples and compare them to 
other ETFs, the Welch test is used for comparisons. The results from the Welch test are presented 
in Table 3-6 for Abnormally High Volatility and in Table 3-7 for Normal Volatility. The Welch 
test again shows the dominance of the leveraged multiple -2 over all the other multiples. There 
might also be a weak linear relation in measuring the impact from leveraged multiples as -3 is 
less than -2, -1, and 2, but it is higher than multiple 3. Thus, while there might not be a strict 
linear relationship, there is evidence of a relationship for linear decrease going from leveraged 
multiple -3 to -2, to -1 to 2. 
3.5 Conclusion 
There is a distinct difference displayed between all ETFs as well as leveraged and 
unleveraged ETFs in periods of normal volatility as well as in periods of high volatility. This 
difference for mean liquidity is a downward shift in value in periods of high volatility but an 
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upward shift in value for mean depth. When leveraged ETFs are disaggreagated into leveraged 
multiples, -3, 2, -1, 2, 3, the difference between periods of normal volatility and high volatility are 
also exhibited. Additionally, there is a difference in the magnitude between the multiples 
themselves. 
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Table 3-1: Summary Statistics for Trading Variables 
Panel A: Summary Statistics of All, Leveraged, and Unleveraged ETFs in High and Normal Volatility for Spread  
 Normal Volatility High Volatility 
 All Leveraged Unleveraged All Leveraged Unleveraged 
 Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev 
9:45 0.074 0.166 0.102 0.229 0.026 0.032 0.596 1.323 0.841 1.543 0.076 0.161 
10:45 0.046 0.069 0.063 0.083 0.016 0.010 0.300 0.503 0.422 0.616 0.030 0.030 
11:45 0.041 0.061 0.056 0.077 0.015 0.009 0.284 0.456 0.391 0.520 0.027 0.024 
12:45 0.039 0.059 0.054 0.075 0.015 0.009 0.276 0.489 0.388 0.590 0.026 0.024 
13:45 0.040 0.062 0.056 0.078 0.015 0.009 0.271 0.441 0.378 0.508 0.027 0.025 
14:45 0.042 0.064 0.058 0.079 0.016 0.010 0.295 0.475 0.409 0.550 0.029 0.028 
15:45 0.045 0.070 0.062 0.085 0.015 0.010 0.388 0.674 0.530 0.798 0.037 0.046 
16:00 0.045 0.073 0.063 0.094 0.015 0.011 0.454 0.889 0.631 1.065 0.038 0.051 
 
Panel B: Summary Statistics of All, Leveraged, and Unleveraged ETFs in High and Normal Volatility for Log Spread  
 Normal Volatility High Volatility 
All Leveraged Unleveraged All Leveraged Unleveraged 
Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev 
9:45 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.009 0.023 0.013 0.027 0.002 0.004 
10:45 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.008 0.006 0.010 0.001 0.001 
11:45 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.001 0.001 
12:45 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.008 0.005 0.010 0.001 0.001 
13:45 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.001 0.001 
14:45 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.001 0.001 
15:45 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.011 0.008 0.013 0.001 0.001 
16:00 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.014 0.009 0.017 0.001 0.001 
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Panel C: Summary Statistics of All, Leveraged, and Unleveraged ETFs in High and Normal Volatility for Quote Slope  
 Normal Volatility High Volatility   
All  Leveraged Unleveraged All Leveraged Unleveraged 
Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev 
9:45 0.022 0.073 0.032 0.104 0.007 0.015 0.244 0.913 0.351 1.098 0.025 0.070 
10:45 0.012 0.026 0.017 0.031 0.003 0.004 0.087 0.198 0.124 0.270 0.009 0.014 
11:45 0.011 0.025 0.016 0.032 0.003 0.004 0.077 0.153 0.106 0.176 0.009 0.013 
12:45 0.011 0.024 0.015 0.030 0.003 0.004 0.079 0.219 0.114 0.282 0.008 0.013 
13:45 0.011 0.026 0.016 0.031 0.003 0.004 0.072 0.130 0.100 0.153 0.008 0.013 
14:45 0.011 0.025 0.016 0.031 0.003 0.004 0.079 0.145 0.109 0.165 0.009 0.016 
15:45 0.012 0.026 0.017 0.031 0.003 0.004 0.116 0.308 0.160 0.383 0.012 0.024 
16:00 0.013 0.029 0.018 0.037 0.003 0.005 0.146 0.452 0.211 0.585 0.013 0.028 
 
Panel D: Summary Statistics of All, Leveraged, and Unleveraged ETFs in High and Normal Volatility for Percentage Spread  
 Normal Volatility High Volatility 
All Leveraged Unleveraged All Leveraged Unleveraged 
Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev 
9:45 0.178 0.378 0.243 0.487 0.058 0.068 0.913 2.255 1.256 2.652 0.179 0.429 
10:45 0.112 0.155 0.152 0.183 0.037 0.026 0.442 0.751 0.611 1.005 0.070 0.070 
11:45 0.098 0.130 0.134 0.155 0.036 0.024 0.417 0.665 0.561 0.746 0.064 0.058 
12:45 0.094 0.129 0.130 0.156 0.035 0.024 0.403 0.815 0.550 0.949 0.062 0.057 
13:45 0.097 0.132 0.134 0.159 0.036 0.024 0.393 0.627 0.533 0.711 0.063 0.056 
14:45 0.102 0.137 0.140 0.162 0.037 0.026 0.433 0.675 0.583 0.766 0.067 0.062 
15:45 0.107 0.143 0.145 0.167 0.036 0.027 0.586 1.089 0.785 1.267 0.082 0.094 
16:00 0.108 0.266 0.148 0.328 0.036 0.028 0.673 1.429 0.910 1.651 0.085 0.105 
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Panel E: Summary Statistics of All, Leveraged, and Unleveraged ETFs in High and Normal Volatility for Bid SIze  
 Normal Volatility High Volatility 
All Leveraged Unleveraged All Leveraged Unleveraged 
Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev 
9:45 355.123 2586.169 366.770 2966.583 323.249 1558.674 51.021 250.015 34.383 203.010 85.533 324.554 
10:45 576.679 3915.181 603.774 4551.580 510.095 2212.230 64.538 329.133 37.286 245.574 133.703 473.166 
11:45 642.077 4265.399 658.236 4980.061 614.872 2551.188 67.178 338.452 41.029 265.777 130.760 463.098 
12:45 712.381 4418.914 705.533 5017.023 726.346 3146.149 89.110 495.483 56.033 419.392 166.971 631.072 
13:45 700.913 4280.296 705.494 4856.561 693.249 3022.144 76.250 456.540 52.135 421.917 136.846 530.725 
14:45 667.535 4244.830 681.401 4891.250 643.794 2719.838 71.287 425.464 47.868 397.658 132.576 487.024 
15:45 702.333 4297.143 668.452 4806.999 736.176 3061.554 71.932 459.162 50.265 446.436 130.310 487.167 
16:00 749.619 4330.948 672.223 4669.349 855.639 3503.867 92.374 598.684 66.132 605.434 161.210 574.520 
 
Panel F: Summary Statistics of All, Leveraged, and Unleveraged ETFs in High and Normal Volatility for Ask Size 
  Normal Volatility High Volatility 
All Leveraged Unleveraged All Leveraged Unleveraged 
Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev 
9:45 328.934 2367.778 335.575 2691.827 307.959 1512.539 53.253 245.981 35.269 183.171 90.724 338.874 
10:45 550.113 3648.099 543.485 4146.074 546.024 2390.931 72.563 374.526 46.790 314.260 138.085 490.608 
11:45 651.791 4018.319 663.895 4631.903 631.875 2600.850 76.891 422.338 52.793 384.491 135.265 494.871 
12:45 685.828 4022.658 677.378 4536.672 702.379 2945.947 91.312 479.370 58.411 395.430 168.717 626.203 
13:45 683.869 4120.232 683.786 4683.396 684.345 2885.308 77.789 450.716 56.008 431.557 132.604 493.772 
14:45 661.948 4136.593 678.767 4755.191 632.935 2686.871 75.536 467.551 54.693 466.011 130.315 470.304 
15:45 738.319 4380.517 704.071 4835.051 771.601 3297.696 69.524 399.873 47.084 372.732 129.946 459.879 
16:00 778.626 4502.532 725.777 4963.822 838.419 3368.575 80.796 451.160 51.448 404.464 157.628 547.913 
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Figure 3-1: All, Leveraged, and Unleveraged ETFs in High Volatility 
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Figure 3-2: All, Leveraged, and Unleveraged ETFs in Normal Volatility 
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Table 3-2: Summary Statistics for Trading Variables by Leveraged Multiple 
Panel A: Summary Statistics for Spread, in High and Normal Volatility by Leveraged Multiple  
 Normal Volatility High Volatility 
  -3 -2 -1 2 3 -3 -2 -1 2 3 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
9:45 0.06 0.07 0.13 0.25 0.14 0.47 0.09 0.22 0.09 0.11 0.30 0.58 1.44 2.19 0.60 1.09 0.64 1.33 0.13 0.20 
10:45 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.11 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.17 0.19 0.70 0.89 0.26 0.22 0.25 0.33 0.08 0.09 
11:45 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.17 0.19 0.65 0.72 0.23 0.19 0.23 0.28 0.08 0.08 
12:45 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.16 0.16 0.67 0.91 0.22 0.18 0.21 0.28 0.08 0.08 
13:45 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.16 0.16 0.63 0.69 0.22 0.17 0.21 0.26 0.08 0.09 
14:45 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.17 0.18 0.68 0.75 0.25 0.19 0.24 0.29 0.08 0.09 
15:45 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.18 0.20 0.88 1.12 0.32 0.30 0.34 0.55 0.10 0.12 
16:00 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.20 0.28 1.06 1.44 0.35 0.35 0.40 0.79 0.11 0.14 
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Panel B: Summary Statistics for Log Spread, in High and Normal Volatility by Leveraged Multipl (x 10^-01) 
 Normal Volatility High Volatility 
  -3 -2 -1 2 3 -3 -2 -1 2 3 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
9:45 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.1 0.2 0.07 0.13 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.05 
10:45 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.1 0.1 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
11:45 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.1 0.1 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
12:45 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.1 0.1 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
13:45 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.1 0.1 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
14:45 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.1 0.1 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
15:45 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.1 0.1 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 
16:00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.1 0.1 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Panel C: Summary Statistics for Quote Slope, in High and Normal Volatility by Leveraged Multiple  
 Normal Volatility High Volatility 
 -3 -2 -1 2 3 -3 -2 -1 2 3 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
9:45 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.04 0.27 0.03 0.12 0.04 0.07 0.14 0.39 0.61 1.51 0.20 0.51 0.32 1.12 0.06 0.11 
10:45 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.21 0.44 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.17 0.03 0.05 
11:45 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.14 0.18 0.27 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.03 0.04 
12:45 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.19 0.41 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.15 0.03 0.05 
13:45 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.16 0.22 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.05 
14:45 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.11 0.17 0.21 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.12 0.03 0.04 
15:45 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.11 0.28 0.61 0.09 0.01 0.10 0.29 0.04 0.06 
16:00 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.14 0.38 0.90 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.37 0.04 0.06 
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Panel D: Summary Statistics for Percentage Spread, in High and Normal Volatility by Leveraged Multiple  
 Normal Volatility High Volatility 
 -3 -2 -1 2 3 -3 -2 -1 2 3 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
9:45 0.16 0.27 0.20 0.67 0.20 0.67 0.32 0.60 0.17 0.21 0.40 0.70 1.18 1.87 0.66 1.26 2.09 3.91 0.34 0.51 
10:45 0.14 0.27 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.21 0.21 0.11 0.10 0.23 0.21 0.54 0.64 0.27 0.26 0.92 1.19 0.21 0.20 
11:45 0.13 0.20 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.18 0.18 0.11 0.09 0.23 0.21 0.51 0.53 0.24 0.22 0.85 0.99 0.21 0.17 
12:45 0.12 0.21 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.18 0.18 0.10 0.09 0.21 0.17 0.52 0.65 0.23 0.20 0.79 1.05 0.21 0.18 
13:45 0.13 0.21 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.18 0.19 0.10 0.09 0.21 0.18 0.49 0.51 0.24 0.21 0.79 0.94 0.21 0.21 
14:45 0.13 0.20 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.19 0.20 0.11 0.10 0.23 0.20 0.52 0.54 0.26 0.23 0.89 1.04 0.21 0.18 
15:45 0.13 0.21 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.20 0.19 0.11 0.10 0.25 0.23 0.71 0.92 0.34 0.35 1.19 1.67 0.27 0.27 
16:00 0.14 0.93 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.20 0.23 0.11 0.10 0.29 0.32 0.85 1.17 0.37 0.38 1.39 2.32 0.29 0.33 
 
 
 
Panel E: Summary Statistics for Bid Size, in High and Normal Volatility by Leveraged Multiple  
 Normal Volatility High Volatility 
 -3 -2 -1 2 3 -3 -2 -1 2 3 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
9:45 171 704 60 222 22 36 1086 5409 48 190 10 29 25 56 14 20 41 172 130 665 
10:45 284 1070 84 451 26 37 1841 8346 108 571 11 31 18 22 13 18 54 235 163 844 
11:45 345 1436 88 423 27 46 2113 9386 110 589 11 28 18 24 15 23 60 274 194 899 
12:45 395 1444 105 483 29 50 2241 9457 152 813 12 36 17 24 15 23 102 574 212 1065 
13:45 419 1643 92 404 28 44 2237 9083 135 594 11 32 19 24 14 22 86 561 226 1117 
14:45 342 1441 9 383 26 42 2164 9096 127 545 10 22 20 26 15 21 79 548 172 970 
15:45 382 1644 99 482 28 60 2087 8932 111 425 11 25 20 27 16 21 78 603 214 1116 
16:00 431 1678 127 633 31 107 2039 8693 171 911 12 26 21 35 18 24 101 729 350 1771 
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Panel F: Summary Statistics for Ask Size, in High and Normal Volatility by Leveraged Multiple  
 Normal Volatility High Volatility 
  -3 -2 -1 2 3 -3 -2 -1 2 3 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
9:45 188 851 53 174 24 32 975 4897 59 271 11 28 22 49 14 21 49 194 118 542 
10:45 375 1663 78 389 28 38 1612 7577 83 359 11 30 19 26 15 23 80 441 155 735 
11:45 379 1422 98 466 30 48 2096 8698 138 691 11 25 19 25 16 22 87 501 231 1059 
12:45 473 1881 95 402 29 44 2123 8500 151 709 13 40 20 27 15 22 103 496 227 1124 
13:45 503 2176 102 467 29 44 2116 8719 121 466 11 27 20 25 15 23 96 576 230 1130 
14:45 409 1602 93 449 27 41 2121 8828 108 397 10 30 19 25 16 24 95 630 201 1175 
15:45 377 1655 115 657 29 49 2200 8955 106 409 12 26 18 25 17 24 75 455 194 1073 
16:00 463 1625 119 588 31 60 2255 9256 132 562 12 25 20 35 17 24 75 395 258 1369 
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Figure 3-3:  Leveraged ETFs by Leverage Multiple in High Volatility  
0.000	  
0.200	  
0.400	  
0.600	  
0.800	  
1.000	  
1.200	  
1.400	  
1.600	  
9:
45
	  
10
:1
5	  
10
:4
5	  
11
:1
5	  
11
:4
5	  
12
:1
5	  
12
:4
5	  
13
:1
5	  
13
:4
5	  
14
:1
5	  
14
:4
5	  
15
:1
5	  
15
:4
5	  
Spreads	  for	  Leveraged	  ETFs	  
-­‐3	   -­‐2	   -­‐1	   2	   3	  
0.000	  
0.005	  
0.010	  
0.015	  
0.020	  
0.025	  
9:
45
	  
10
:1
5	  
10
:4
5	  
11
:1
5	  
11
:4
5	  
12
:1
5	  
12
:4
5	  
13
:1
5	  
13
:4
5	  
14
:1
5	  
14
:4
5	  
15
:1
5	  
15
:4
5	  
Log	  Spreads	  for	  Leveraged	  ETFs	  
-­‐3	   -­‐2	   -­‐1	   2	   3	  
0.000	  
0.100	  
0.200	  
0.300	  
0.400	  
0.500	  
0.600	  
0.700	  
9:
45
	  
10
:1
5	  
10
:4
5	  
11
:1
5	  
11
:4
5	  
12
:1
5	  
12
:4
5	  
13
:1
5	  
13
:4
5	  
14
:1
5	  
14
:4
5	  
15
:1
5	  
15
:4
5	  
Quote	  Slope	  of	  Leveraged	  ETFs	  
-­‐3	   -­‐2	   -­‐1	   2	   3	  
0.000	  
0.500	  
1.000	  
1.500	  
2.000	  
2.500	  
9:
45
	  
10
:1
5	  
10
:4
5	  
11
:1
5	  
11
:4
5	  
12
:1
5	  
12
:4
5	  
13
:1
5	  
13
:4
5	  
14
:1
5	  
14
:4
5	  
15
:1
5	  
15
:4
5	  
%	  Spread	  for	  Leveraged	  ETFs	  
-­‐3	   -­‐2	   -­‐1	   2	   3	  
0.00	  
50.00	  
100.00	  
150.00	  
200.00	  
250.00	  
300.00	  
350.00	  
400.00	  
9:
45
	  
10
:1
5	  
10
:4
5	  
11
:1
5	  
11
:4
5	  
12
:1
5	  
12
:4
5	  
13
:1
5	  
13
:4
5	  
14
:1
5	  
14
:4
5	  
15
:1
5	  
15
:4
5	  
Bid	  Size	  of	  Leveraged	  ETFs	  
-­‐3	   -­‐2	   -­‐1	   2	   3	  
0.00	  
50.00	  
100.00	  
150.00	  
200.00	  
250.00	  
300.00	  
9:
45
	  
10
:1
5	  
10
:4
5	  
11
:1
5	  
11
:4
5	  
12
:1
5	  
12
:4
5	  
13
:1
5	  
13
:4
5	  
14
:1
5	  
14
:4
5	  
15
:1
5	  
15
:4
5	  
Ask	  Size	  for	  Leveraged	  ETFs	  
-­‐3	   -­‐2	   -­‐1	   2	   3	  
78 
  
  
  
 
Figure 3-4: Leveraged ETFs by Leveraged Multiple in Normal Volatility  
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Table 3-3: Difference of Means Test Results 
Panel A: Difference of Means (High-Normal Volatility) for Spread (S) and Percentage Spread (PS) 
 -3 -2 -1 1 2 3 L A -3 -2 -1 1 2 3 L A 
Time S S S S S S S S PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS 
9:45 0.241 1.314 0.469 0.050 0.553 0.037 0.739 0.522 0.245 0.919 0.455 0.121 1.775 0.177 1.012 0.734 
10:45 0.120 0.613 0.209 0.014 0.188 0.018 0.359 0.254 0.093 0.369 0.192 0.033 0.712 0.096 0.459 0.330 
11:45 0.122 0.570 0.180 0.012 0.178 0.017 0.335 0.243 0.098 0.353 0.162 0.028 0.668 0.096 0.426 0.319 
12:45 0.113 0.598 0.172 0.011 0.163 0.023 0.334 0.237 0.086 0.381 0.151 0.027 0.612 0.103 0.420 0.309 
13:45 0.110 0.556 0.175 0.012 0.161 0.025 0.322 0.231 0.084 0.354 0.161 0.027 0.603 0.111 0.400 0.297 
14:45 0.119 0.605 0.198 0.013 0.184 0.021 0.351 0.253 0.096 0.378 0.182 0.030 0.697 0.100 0.443 0.330 
15:45 0.130 0.797 0.268 0.022 0.288 0.042 0.468 0.342 0.117 0.556 0.260 0.046 0.995 0.157 0.640 0.479 
16:00 0.158 0.971 0.296 0.023 0.349 0.054 0.568 0.409 0.143 0.692 0.288 0.048 1.184 0.182 0.762 0.565 
* All differences of means are significant at 1% level assuming equal and unequal variances 
 
 
 
Panel B: Difference of Means (High-Normal Volatility) for Log Spread (LS) and Quote Slope (QS) 
 -3 -2 -1 1 2 3 L A -3 -2 -1 1 2 3 L A 
Time QSl QSl QSl QSl QSl QSl QSl QSl LS LS LS LS LS LS LS LS 
9:45 0.124 0.573 0.154 0.019 0.290 0.018 0.319 0.222 0.002 0.009 0.005 0.001 0.018 0.002 0.010 0.007 
10:45 0.058 0.185 0.069 0.006 0.059 0.005 0.107 0.075 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.007 0.001 0.005 0.003 
11:45 0.066 0.154 0.053 0.006 0.048 0.006 0.090 0.066 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.007 0.001 0.004 0.003 
12:45 0.058 0.168 0.050 0.005 0.048 0.010 0.098 0.069 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.006 0.001 0.004 0.003 
13:45 0.057 0.143 0.053 0.005 0.042 0.011 0.084 0.061 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.006 0.001 0.004 0.003 
14:45 0.060 0.153 0.058 0.006 0.052 0.006 0.092 0.068 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.007 0.001 0.004 0.003 
15:45 0.058 0.256 0.071 0.009 0.094 0.015 0.143 0.104 0.001 0.006 0.003 0.000 0.010 0.002 0.006 0.005 
16:00 0.064 0.354 0.081 0.010 0.115 0.014 0.193 0.134 0.001 0.007 0.003 0.000 0.012 0.002 0.008 0.006 
* All differences of means are significant at 1% level assuming equal and unequal variances 
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Panel C: Difference of Means (High-Normal Volatility) for Bid Size(S) and Offer Size (PS) 
 -3 -2 -1 1 2 3 L A -3 -2 -1 1 2 3 L A 
Time BS BS BS BS BS BS BS BS AS AS AS AS AS AS AS AS 
9:45 -160.9 -35.2 -8.6 -237.7 -1045.8 81.9 -332.3 -304.1 -177.4 -31.4 -10.1 -217.2 -926.3 58.9 -300.3 -275.6 
10:45 -273.5 -66.1 -13.3 -376.3 -1787.9 54.9 -566.4 -512.1 -364.0 -59.2 -12.7 -407.9 -1532.4 72.3 -496.7 -477.5 
11:45 -334.4 -69.7 -13.4 -484.1 -2052.6 83.7 -617.2 -574.9 -368.8 -78.1 -14.3 -496.6 -2008.7 93.1 -611.1 -574.9 
12:45 -382.9 -87.5 -14.5 -559.3 -2139.4 59.9 -649.0 -623.2 -460.6 -75.5 -13.3 -533.6 -2019.5 76.2 -618.9 -594.5 
13:45 -407.7 -72.7 -13.7 -556.4 -2151.9 90.4 -653.3 -624.6 -491.9 -82.8 -13.8 -551.7 -2020.1 108.6 -627.7 -606.1 
14:45 -333.2 -58.3 -11.3 -511.2 -2085.5 44.5 -633.5 -596.2 -399.4 -73.4 -11.4 -502.6 -2026.1 93.1 -624.1 -586.4 
15:45 -371.6 -78.3 -11.9 -605.8 -2009.7 103.2 -618.1 -630.4 -365.9 -97.3 -12.6 -641.6 -2125.2 87.7 -656.9 -668.7 
16:00 -419.7 -105.9 -13.7 -694.4 -1938.5 178.4 -606.0 -657.2 -450.7 -99.3 -14.6 -680.7 -2181.1 125.5 -674.3 -697.8 
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Table 3-4: Jonckheere-Terpstra Test Results for Spreads, Ask Size (AS) and Bid Size (BS) in High and Normal Volatility 
 Spreads High Spreads Normal AS High AS Normal BS High BS Normal 
Statistic 2.90E+14 2.68E+14 4.84E+14 2.78E+14 4.60E+14 2.80E+14 
Z -2295.6566 -55.265 1292.6635 202.9798 849.3866 244.1068 
p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
N 49376492 38474836 49376492 38474836 49376492 38474836 
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Table 3-5: Regression Results 
Panel A: Multivariate Regression Analysis in High Volatility of Liquidity and Depth Variables 
 𝑌𝑌?? = 𝛼𝛼? +    𝛽𝛽?𝐷𝐷?????? + 𝛽𝛽?𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇?? + 𝛽𝛽?𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉?? + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶?? + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇?? + 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸?? 
 -3 -2 -1 2 3 Int Vol TO R
2 
 
Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
   S 0.119 0.106 0.415 0.068 0.174 0.068 0.135 0.068 0.044 0.105 0.027 0.055 0.394 0.121 0.940 
QSp 0.060 0.053 0.207 0.034 0.087 0.034 0.067 0.034 0.022 0.053 0.013 0.028 0.394 0.060 0.940 
LS 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.439 0.005 0.910 
PS 0.107 0.110 0.166 0.070 0.100 0.071 0.369 0.071 0.109 0.109 0.049 0.056 0.523 0.143 0.882 
QSl 0.051 0.036 0.098 0.023 0.055 0.023 0.034 0.023 0.024 0.035 0.005 0.020 0.386 -0.008 0.906 
BS -28.483 6.639 -20.603 4.330 -24.042 4.334 -19.832 4.291 -28.156 6.636 34.304 3.111 0.217 0.511 0.922 
AS -25.215 5.812 -16.990 3.793 -20.430 3.796 -14.823 3.752 -23.259 5.810 30.224 2.734 0.233 3.072 0.937 
 
Panel B: Multivariate Regression Analysis in Normal Volatility of Liquidity and Depth Variables 
 𝑌𝑌?? = 𝛼𝛼? +    𝛽𝛽?𝐷𝐷?????? + 𝛽𝛽?𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇?? + 𝛽𝛽?𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉?? + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶?? + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇?? + 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸?? 
 -3 -2 -1 2 3 Int Vol TO R
2 
 Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE    
S 0.033 0.017 0.061 0.016 0.052 0.016 0.041 0.016 0.077 0.016 0.019 0.018 0.177 -0.031 1.000 
QSp 0.016 0.008 0.031 0.008 0.026 0.008 0.021 0.008 0.038 0.008 0.010 0.009 0.177 -0.016 1.000 
LS 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.221 -0.006 0.892 
PS 0.101 0.018 0.090 0.018 0.066 0.018 0.114 0.018 0.094 0.018 0.039 0.018 0.342 -0.411 0.925 
QSl 0.019 0.005 0.020 0.005 0.018 0.005 0.014 0.005 0.030 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.183 -0.075 1.000 
BS 209.951 40.125 130.974 39.556 118.603 39.721 -29.811 41.167 125.120 40.209 -100.293 28.696 0.298 -15.232 0.883 
OS 188.539 46.103 65.819 45.430 50.658 45.617 81.943 46.937 64.969 46.209 -28.219 32.941 0.268 -37.395 0.855 
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Table 3-6: Z statistic for Comparing Regression Coefficients in High Volatility 
𝑍𝑍 =   
𝛽𝛽? − 𝛽𝛽?
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆?
? + 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆?
?
 
Spread  Statistic -3 -2 -1 2 3 
-3 0.000 2.357 0.438 0.125 -0.506 
-2 -2.357 0.000 -2.497 -2.920 -2.966 
-1 -0.438 2.497 0.000 -0.410 -1.041 
2 -0.125 2.920 0.410 0.000 -0.728 
3 0.506 2.966 1.041 0.728 0.000 
Quoted Spread Statistic -3 -2 -1 2 3 
-3 0.000 2.357 0.438 0.125 -0.506 
-2 -2.357 0.000 -2.497 -2.920 -2.966 
-1 -0.438 2.497 0.000 -0.410 -1.041 
2 -0.125 2.920 0.410 0.000 -0.728 
3 0.506 2.966 1.041 0.728 0.000 
Log Spread Statistic -3 -2 -1 2 3 
-3 0.000 0.382 0.140 2.182 0.092 
-2 -0.382 0.000 -0.316 2.390 -0.275 
-1 -0.140 0.316 0.000 2.677 -0.031 
2 -2.182 -2.390 -2.677 0.000 -2.092 
3 -0.092 0.275 0.031 2.092 0.000 
Percent Spread Statistic -3 -2 -1 2 3 
-3 0.000 0.445 -0.053 2.000 0.009 
-2 -0.445 0.000 -0.650 2.044 -0.436 
-1 0.053 0.650 0.000 2.678 0.064 
2 -2.000 -2.044 -2.678 0.000 -2.000 
3 -0.009 0.436 -0.064 2.000 0.000 
Quote Slope Statistic -3 -2 -1 2 3 
-3 0.000 1.109 0.092 -0.402 -0.543 
-2 -1.109 0.000 -1.330 -1.998 -1.767 
-1 -0.092 1.330 0.000 -0.647 -0.738 
2 0.402 1.998 0.647 0.000 -0.245 
3 0.543 1.767 0.738 0.245 0.000 
Bid Size Statistic -3 -2 -1 2 3 
-3 0.000 0.994 0.560 1.094 0.035 
-2 -0.994 0.000 -0.561 0.126 -0.953 
-1 -0.560 0.561 0.000 0.690 -0.519 
2 -1.094 -0.126 -0.690 0.000 -1.053 
3 -0.035 0.953 0.519 1.053 0.000 
Offer Size Statistic -3 -2 -1 2 3 
-3 0.000 1.185 0.689 1.502 0.238 
-2 -1.185 0.000 -0.641 0.406 -0.904 
-1 -0.689 0.641 0.000 1.051 -0.408 
2 -1.502 -0.406 -1.051 0.000 -1.220 
3 -0.238 0.904 0.408 1.220 0.000 
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Table 3-7: Z statistic for Comparing Regression Coefficients in Normal Volatility 
𝑍𝑍 =   
𝛽𝛽? − 𝛽𝛽?
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆?
? + 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆?
?
 
Spread  Statistic -3 -2 -1 2 3 
-3 0.000 1.256 0.827 0.374 1.898 
-2 -1.256 0.000 -0.417 -0.901 0.666 
-1 -0.827 0.417 0.000 -0.469 1.068 
2 -0.374 0.901 0.469 0.000 1.559 
3 -1.898 -0.666 -1.068 -1.559 0.000 
Quoted Spread Statistic -3 -2 -1 2 3 
-3 0.000 1.256 0.827 0.374 1.898 
-2 -1.256 0.000 -0.417 -0.901 0.666 
-1 -0.827 0.417 0.000 -0.469 1.068 
2 -0.374 0.901 0.469 0.000 1.559 
3 -1.898 -0.666 -1.068 -1.559 0.000 
Log Spread Statistic -3 -2 -1 2 3 
-3 0.000 -0.063 -0.851 1.091 0.636 
-2 0.063 0.000 -0.804 1.177 0.712 
-1 0.851 0.804 0.000 1.961 1.495 
2 -1.091 -1.177 -1.961 0.000 -0.452 
3 -0.636 -0.712 -1.495 0.452 0.000 
Percent Spread Statistic -3 -2 -1 2 3 
-3 0.000 -0.441 -1.389 0.494 -0.278 
-2 0.441 0.000 -0.967 0.950 0.162 
-1 1.389 0.967 0.000 1.907 1.117 
2 -0.494 -0.950 -1.907 0.000 -0.778 
3 0.278 -0.162 -1.117 0.778 0.000 
Quote Slope Statistic -3 -2 -1 2 3 
-3 0.000 0.204 -0.045 -0.691 1.575 
-2 -0.204 0.000 -0.250 -0.912 1.399 
-1 0.045 0.250 0.000 -0.646 1.624 
2 0.691 0.912 0.646 0.000 2.303 
3 -1.575 -1.399 -1.624 -2.303 0.000 
Bid Size Statistic -3 -2 -1 2 3 
-3 0.000 -1.402 -1.618 -4.171 -1.493 
-2 1.402 0.000 -0.221 -2.816 -0.104 
-1 1.618 0.221 0.000 -2.594 0.115 
2 4.171 2.816 2.594 0.000 2.692 
3 1.493 0.104 -0.115 -2.692 0.000 
Offer Size Statistic -3 -2 -1 2 3 
-3 0.000 -1.896 -2.126 -1.620 -1.893 
-2 1.896 0.000 -0.236 0.247 -0.013 
-1 2.126 0.236 0.000 0.478 0.220 
2 1.620 -0.247 -0.478 0.000 -0.258 
3 1.893 0.013 -0.220 0.258 0.000 
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